ONCE AND FOR ALL!

THE MANTRA of this round was Once And For All.

23 november 2012, Gush Shalom גוש שלום http://zope.gush-shalom.org (Israel)

Uri Avnery

“We must put an end to this (the rockets, Hamas, the Palestinians, the Arabs?) Once and For All!” – this cry from the heart was heard dozens of times daily on TV from the harassed inhabitants of Israel’s battered towns and villages in the South.

It has displaced the slogan which dominated several decades: “Bang And Finish!”

It did not quite work.

THE BIG winner emerging from the cloud is Hamas.

Until this round, Hamas had a powerful presence in the Gaza Strip, but practically no international standing. The international face of the Palestinian people was Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestinian National Authority.

No more.

Operation Pillar of Cloud has given the Hamas mini-state in Gaza wide international recognition. (Pillar of Cloud is the official Hebrew name, though the army spokesman decreed that the English name, for foreign consumption, should be Pillar of Defense.) Heads of state and droves of other foreign dignitaries made their pilgrimage to the Strip.

First was the powerful and immensely rich Emir of Qatar, owner of Aljazeera. He was the first head of state ever to enter the Gaza strip. Then came the Egyptian prime minister, the Tunisian foreign minister, the secretary of the Arab League and the collected Arab foreign ministers (except the one from Ramallah.)

In all diplomatic deliberations, Gaza was treated as a de facto state, with a de facto government (Hamas). The Israeli media were no exception. It was clear to Israelis that any deal, to be effective, must be concluded with Hamas.

Within the Palestinian people, the standing of Hamas shot sky-high. The Gaza Strip alone, smaller than an average American county, has stood up to the mighty Israeli war machine, one of the largest and most efficient in the world. It has not succumbed. The military outcome will be at best a draw.

A draw between tiny Gaza and the powerful Israel means a victory for Gaza.

Who remembers now Ehud Barak’s proud declaration in the middle of the war: “We shall not stop until Hamas gets on its knees and begs for a cease-fire!”[*]

WHERE DOES that leave Mahmoud Abbas? Actually, nowhere.

For a simple Palestinian, whether in Nablus, Gaza or Beirut, the contrast is glaring. Hamas is courageous, proud, upright, while Fatah is helpless, submissive and despised. Pride and honor play a central role in Arab culture.

After more than half a century of humiliation, any Palestinian who stands up against the occupation is the hero of the Arab masses, in and outside the country. Abbas is identified only with the close cooperation of his security forces with the hated Israeli occupation army. And the most important fact: Abbas has nothing to show for it.

If Abbas could at least show a major political achievement for his pains, the situation might be different. The Palestinians are a sensible people, and if Abbas had come even one step closer to Palestinian statehood, most Palestinians would probably have said: he may not be glamorous, but he delivers the goods.

But the opposite is happening. The violent Hamas is achieving results, the non-violent Abbas is not. As a Palestinian told me: “He (Abbas) has given them (the Israelis) everything, quiet and security, and what did [or “does”] he get in return? They spit in his face!”

This round will only reinforce a basic Palestinian conviction: “Israelis understand only the language of force!” (Israelis, of course, say exactly the same about the Palestinians.)

If at least the US had allowed Abbas to achieve a UN resolution recognizing Palestine as a non-member state, he might have held his own against Hamas. But the Israeli government is determined to prevent this by all available means. Barack Obama’s decision, even after re-election, to block the Palestinian effort is a direct support for Hamas and a slap in the face of the “moderates”. Hillary Clinton’s perfunctory visit to Ramallah this week was seen in this context.

Looked at from the outside, this looks like sheer lunacy. Why undermine the “moderates” who want and are able to make peace? Why elevate the “extremists”, who are opposed to peace?

The answer is openly expressed by Avigdor Lieberman, now Netanyahu’s official political No. 2: he wants to destroy Abbas in order to annex the West Bank and clear the way for the settlers.

AFTER HAMAS, the big winner is Mohamed Morsi.

This is an almost incredible tale. When Morsi was elected as the president of Egypt, official Israel was in hysteria. How terrible! The Islamist extremists have taken over the most important Arab country! Our peace treaty with our largest neighbor is going down the drain!

US reactions were almost the same.

And now – less than four months later – we hang on every word Morsi utters. He is the man who has put an end to the mutual killing and destruction! He is the great peacemaker! He is the only person who can mediate between Israel and Hamas! He must guarantee the cease-fire agreement!

Can it be? Can this be the same Morsi? The same Muslim Brotherhood?

The 61 year old Morsi (the full name is Mohamed Morsi Isa al-Ayyad. Isa being the Arab form of Jesus, who is regarded in Islam as a prophet) is a complete novice on the world stage. Yet at this moment, all the world’s leaders rely on him.

When I wholeheartedly welcomed the Arab Spring, I had people like him in mind. Now almost all the Israeli commentators, ex-generals and politicians, who uttered dire warnings at the time, are lauding his success in achieving a cease-fire.

THROUGHOUT THE operation I did what I always do in such situations: I switched constantly between Israeli TV and Aljazeera. Sometimes, when my thoughts wander, I am unsure for a moment which of the two I am looking at.

Women weeping, wounded being carried away, homes in shambles, children’s shoes strewn around, families packing and fleeing. Here and there. Mirror images. Though, of course, Palestinian casualties were 30 times higher than the Israeli ones – partly because of the incredible success of the Iron Dome interception missiles and home shelters, while the Palestinians were practically defenseless.

On Wednesday I was invited to air my views on Israel’s Channel 2, the most popular (and patriotic) Israeli outlet. The invitation was of course withdrawn at the last moment. Had I been on air, I would have posed to my compatriots one simple question:

Was It Worthwhile?

All the suffering, the killed, the injured, the destruction, the hours and days of terror, the children in trauma?

And, I might add, the endless TV coverage around the clock, with legions of ex-generals appearing on the screen and declaiming the message sheet of the prime minister’s office. And the blood-curdling threats of politicians and other nincompoops, including the son of Ariel Sharon, who proposed flattening neighborhoods in Gaza City, or even better, the whole Strip.

Now that it is over, we are almost exactly where we were before. The operation, commonly referred to in Israel as “another round”, was indeed round – leading nowhere than to where it started.

Hamas will be firmly in control of the Gaza Strip, if not more firmly. The Gazans will hate Israel even more than before. Many of the inhabitants of the West Bank, who throughout the war came out in their thousands in demonstrations for Hamas, will vote in even greater numbers for Hamas in the next elections. Israeli voters will vote in two months as they intended to vote anyhow, before the whole thing started.

Each of the two sides is now celebrating its great victory. If they organized just one joint celebration, a lot of money could be saved.

WHAT ARE the political conclusions?

The most obvious one is: talk with Hamas. Directly. Face to face.

Yitzhak Rabin once told me how he came to the conclusion that he must talk with the PLO: after years of opposing it, he realized that they were the only force that counted. “So it was ridiculous to talk with them through intermediaries.”

The same is now true for Hamas. They are there. They will not go away. It is ridiculous for the Israeli negotiators to sit in one room at the Egyptian intelligence service HQ near Cairo, while the Hamas negotiators sit in another room, just a few meters away, with the courteous Egyptians going to and fro.

Concurrently, activate the effort towards peace. Seriously.

Save Abbas. As of now, he has no replacement. Give him an immediate victory to balance the Hamas achievements. Vote for the Palestinian application for statehood in the UN General Assembly.

Move towards peace with the entire Palestinian people, including Fatah and Hamas – so we can really put an end to the violence,

ONCE AND FOR ALL!

[*] “If Hamas goes down on its knees tomorrow and begs us to stop, we’ll consider stopping. It also depends on the other side. Meanwhile, as long as this is not happening we’re going ahead.” www.haaretz.com

THE GRAND DEFAULT

29 september 2012, Gush Shalom http://www.avnery-news.co.il/english (Israel)

Uri Avnery's Column

I AM sitting here writing this article 39 years to the minute from that moment when the sirens started screaming, announcing the beginning of the war.

A minute before, total quiet reigned, as it does now. No traffic, no activity in the street, except a few children riding bicycles. Yom Kippur, the holiest day for Jews, reigned supreme. And then…

Inevitably, the memory starts to work.

THIS YEAR, many new documents were released for publication. Critical books and articles are abundant.

The universal culprits are Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan.

They have been blamed before, right from the day after the war, but only for superficial military offences, known as The Default. The default was failing to mobilize the reserves, and not moving the tanks to the front in time, in spite of the many signs that Egypt and Syria were about to attack.

Now, for the first time, the real Grand Default is being explored: the political background of the war. The findings have a direct bearing on what is happening now.

IT TRANSPIRES that in February 1973, eight months before the war, Anwar Sadat sent his trusted aide, Hafez Ismail, to the almighty US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. He offered the immediate start of peace negotiations with Israel. There was one condition and one date: all of Sinai, up to the international border, had to be returned to Egypt without any Israeli settlements, and the agreement had to be achieved by September, at the latest.

Kissinger liked the proposal and transmitted it at once to the Israeli ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin, who was just about to finish his term in office. Rabin, of course, immediately informed the Prime Minister, Golda Meir. She rejected the offer out of hand. There ensued a heated conversation between the ambassador and the Prime Minister. Rabin, who was very close to Kissinger, was in favor of accepting the offer.

Golda treated the whole initiative as just another Arab trick to induce her to give up the Sinai Peninsula and remove the settlements built on Egyptian territory.

After all, the real purpose of these settlements – including the shining white new town, Yamit – was precisely to prevent the return of the entire peninsula to Egypt. Neither she nor Dayan dreamed of giving up Sinai. Dayan had already made the (in)famous statement that he preferred “Sharm al-Sheik without peace to peace without Sharm al-Sheik”. (Sharm al-Sheik, which had already been re-baptised with the Hebrew name Ophira, is located near the southern tip of the peninsula, not far from the oil wells, which Dayan was also loath to give up.)

Even before the new disclosures, the fact that Sadat had made several peace overtures was no secret. Sadat had indicated his willingness to reach an agreement in his dealings with the UN mediator Dr. Gunnar Jarring, whose endeavors had already become a joke in Israel.

Before that, the previous Egyptian President, Gamal Abd-al-Nasser, had invited Nahum Goldman, the President of the World Jewish Congress (and for a time President of the World Zionist Organization) to meet him in Cairo. Golda had prevented that meeting, and when the fact became known there was a storm of protest in Israel, including a famous letter from a group of eighth-graders saying that it would be hard for them to serve in the army.

All these Egyptian initiatives could be waved aside as political maneuvers. But an official message by Sadat to the Secretary of State could not. So, remembering the lesson of the Goldman incident, Golda decided to keep the whole thing secret.

THUS AN incredible situation was created. This fateful initiative, which could have effected an historic turning point, was brought to the knowledge of two people only: Moshe Dayan and Israel Galili.

The role of the latter needs explanation. Galili was the eminence grise of Golda, as well as of her predecessor, Levy Eshkol. I knew Galili quite well, and never understood where his renown as a brilliant strategist came from. Already before the founding of the state, he was the leading light of the illegal Haganah military organization. As a member of a kibbutz, he was officially a socialist but in reality a hardline nationalist. It was he who had the brilliant idea of putting the settlements on Egyptian soil, in order to make the return of northern Sinai impossible.

So the Sadat initiative was known only to Golda, Dayan, Galili and Rabin and Rabin’s successor in Washington, Simcha Dinitz, a nobody who was Golda’s lackey.

Incredible as it may sound, the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, Rabin’s direct boss, was not informed. Nor were all the other ministers, the Chief of Staff and the other leaders of the armed forces, including the Chiefs of Army Intelligence, as well as the chiefs of the Shin Bet and the Mossad. It was a state secret.

There was no debate about it – neither public nor secret. September came and passed, and on October 6th Sadat’s troops struck across the canal and achieved a world-shaking surprise success (as did the Syrians on the Golan Heights.)

As a direct result of Golda’s Grand Default 2693 Israeli soldiers died, 7251 were wounded and 314 were taken prisoner (along with the tens of thousands of Egyptian and Syrian casualties).

THIS WEEK, several Israeli commentators bemoaned the total silence of the media and the politicians at the time.

Well, not quite total. Several months before the war, in a speech in the Knesset, I warned Golda Meir that if the Sinai was not returned very soon, Sadat would start a war to break the impasse.

I knew what I was talking about. I had, of course, no idea about the Ismail mission, but in May 1973 I took part in a peace conference in Bologna. The Egyptian delegation was led by Khalid Muhyi al-Din, a member of the original group of Free Officers who made the 1952 revolution. During the conference, he took me aside and told me in confidence that if the Sinai was not returned by September, Sadat would start a war. Sadat had no illusions of victory, he said, but hoped that a war would compel the US and Israel to start negotiations for the return of Sinai.

My warning was completely ignored by the media. They, like Golda, held the Egyptian army in abysmal contempt and considered Sadat a nincompoop. The idea that the Egyptians would dare to attack the invincible Israeli army seemed ridiculous.

The media adored Golda. So did the whole world, especially feminists. (A famous poster showed her face with the inscription: “But can she type?”) In reality, Golda was a very primitive person, ignorant and obstinate. My magazine, Haolam Hazeh, attacked her practically every week, and so did I in the Knesset. (She paid me the unique compliment of publicly declaring that she was ready to “mount the barricades” to get me out of the Knesset.)

Ours was a voice crying in the wilderness, but at least we fulfilled one function: In her ‘March of Folly”, Barbara Tuchman stipulated that a policy could be branded as folly only if there had been at least one voice warning against it in real time.

Perhaps even Golda would have reconsidered if she had not been surrounded by journalists and politicians singing her praises, celebrating her wisdom and courage and applauding every one of her stupid pronouncements.

THE SAME type of people, even some of the very same people, are now doing the same with Binyamin Netanyahu.

Again, we are staring the same Grand Default in the face.

Again, a group of two or three are deciding the fate of the nation. Netanyahu and Ehud Barak alone make all the decisions, “keeping their cards close to their chest”. Attack Iran or not? Politicians and generals are kept in the dark. Bibi and Ehud know best. No need for any other input.

But more revealing than the blood-curdling threats on Iran is the total silence about Palestine. Palestinian peace offers are ignored, as were those of Sadat in those days. The ten-year old Arab Peace Initiative, supported by all the Arab and all the Muslim states, does not exist.

Again, settlements are put up and expanded, in order to make the return of the occupied territories impossible. (Let’s remember all those who claimed, in those days, that the occupation of Sinai was “irreversible”. Who would dare to remove Yamit?)

Again, multitudes of flatterers, media stars and politicians compete with each other in adulation of “Bibi, King of Israel”. How smoothly he can talk in American English! How convincing his speeches in the UN and the US Senate!

Well, Golda, with her 200 words of bad Hebrew and primitive American, was much more convincing, and she enjoyed the adulation of the whole Western world. And at least she had the sense not to challenge the incumbent American president (Richard Nixon) during an election campaign.

IN THOSE days, I called our government “the ship of fools”. Our current government is worse, much worse.

Golda and Dayan led us to disaster. After the war, their war, they were kicked out – not by elections, not by any committee of inquiry, but by the grassroots mass protests that racked the country.
Bibi and Ehud are leading us to another, far worse, disaster. Some day, they will be kicked out by the same people who adore them now - if they survive.

EGYPT THUMBS THE NOSE AT US

21 August 2012, Asia Times Online

By M K Bhadrakumar

The gloom in Washington must be deepening. Egypt is careering away from the alliance with the United States - and the bitter truth cannot be hidden or obfuscated anymore.

This is not how Washington expected the "right side of history" to play out. The Arab Spring has borne a strange fruit in Egypt - a pure breed, unlike the hybrids in Tunisia, Libya or Yemen.

Consider the following. President Barack Obama was one of the first statesmen to greet Mohammed Morsi on his election victory in May. Obama broke protocol and phoned to congratulate him, signifying the anxiety in Washington to have a splendid chemistry with him.

Then, Obama wrote a letter to Morsi and he deputed Deputy Secretary of State William Burns to fly to Cairo and deliver it in person. Burns was followed to Cairo by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, again for an audience with Morsi. That, in turn, was followed by the visit to Cairo by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. All this, within the first month of Morsi's presidency.

Panetta came back to Washington greatly pleased that the Egyptian military leadership, which has been the anchor sheet of the US regional strategy and the custodian of the US' interests in Egypt, and Morsi were not only getting alone fine but they even had a common agenda.

The rest is history. Within days or weeks of Panetta's optimism, Morsi unceremoniously sent the military back to the barracks from the corridors of political power. Washington had no choice but to put a brave face on it, almost spreading a canard that Morsi consulted the Obama administration before cracking down on the Egyptian military.

However, in the weekend, the truth is out. The US may be facing across a huge setback to its robust efforts to influence Morsi's presidency. The letter that Burns carried a month ago apparently contained an invitation from Obama to Morsi to visit Washington.

And Morsi is instead travelling to China and Iran.

This was announced on the Egyptian president's official website on Sunday. Morsi is apparently combining the visits to China and Iran. It seems he will pay a three-day visit to China next Monday at the invitation of President Hu Jintao and from Beijing he proposes to travel to Tehran on Thursday to attend the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Beijing is yet to announce a visit by Morsi. The government-owned China Daily, in fact, featured a commentary on Monday exclusively titled "Morsi's visit to Iran could reshape political landscape", which pointedly sidestepped any suggestion that the Egyptian president's itinerary would include Beijing as well.

However, Egypt's flagship newspaper Al-Ahram has reported that Morsi and Hu "plan to discuss crucial issues facing the Arab world, such as the Syrian situation and the Palestinian question. The two presidents will also discuss ways of enhancing commercial exchange between their respective countries, in addition to increasing Chinese investment in Egypt."

Al-Ahram summed up: "The two visits may mark changes in Egypt's foreign policy, given that both countries [China and Iran] have tense relations with the United States, to whom Egypt has been a loyal ally, especially under the rule of ousted president Hosni Mubarak."

Nobody's poodle

Indeed, the Middle East is waking up to the fact that the Americans are in the dog house in Cairo. Without doubt, this decision bears the stamp of the Muslim Brotherhood. What are the calculations?

First, Brothers know that this will go down extremely well with the public mood in Egypt, which is vehemently demanding a new foreign policy orientation that jettisons the Mubarak-era partnership with the US and Israel and a return to the country's independent foreign policy.

Second, Morsi does not want to depend too heavily on the dole-outs by the International Monetary Fund and/or the wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which he is hard-pressed to accept while knowing that they come with political strings attached.

The International Monetary Fund is dictating tough terms for a US$3.2 billion loan for Egypt. The Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank agreed to give Egypt $2.5 billion in financing. Qatar is depositing $2 billion in the Central Bank of Egypt aimed at alleviating Egypt's foreign exchange shortage. Last year in May, Saudi Arabia announced aid to Egypt totaling $4 billion in "soft loans, deposits and grants". A US-led struggle was keenly underway to buy off Egypt's soul.

Conceivably, Morsi eyes China as a potential investor in the Egyptian economy because Beijing attaches no strings to economic cooperation and plays generally by the market rules, attuned to the neo-liberal policies that Morsi would be largely pursuing. The point is, Brothers know pretty well that the GCC countries - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia - but especially Saudi Arabia, view them intrinsically with distaste and disquiet as posing an existential danger to their authoritarian regimes. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has had a troubled relationship with the Brotherhood.

The late Crown Prince Nayef used brutal methods to suppress the activities of the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi establishment daily Asharq Al-Awasat displayed its antipathy toward Morsi as recently as Saturday, when in a signed article the daily's senior editor Osman Mirghani wrote,

The blow that Mursi struck [at the military], allowing him to seize power, was completely unforeseen, not just on the part of the SCAF leadership, but for the Egyptian people as a whole ... These decisions were akin to a coup d'etat ... Brotherhood has attempted to dominate the political arena since they hijacked the revolution and rode the revolutionary wave into government, despite the fact that they joined this revolution quite late ... Brotherhood has sought to undermine all other parties and therefore purposely refused to cooperate or coordinate with them during the transitional period prior to the elections.

'Egypt is now being governed by declarations and "constitutional" decisions that are issued by a president who has far more powers than Mubarak ever did ... If some people are saying that Mursi ... has liberated himself and the presidency from the army's custody and intervention, then the question that must be asked here is: will this be followed by Mursi liberating himself from the Brotherhood, which seems to be present in all his decisions and measures?"

It is useful to bear in mind that this sharp criticism appeared within a month of Morsi's visit to Riyadh at the invitation of King Abdullah and within two days of the extraordinary summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Jeddah, which Morsi attended.

The narrative has been that Morsi while addressing the OIC summit called for "regime change" in Syria - implying that Egypt is a dutiful camp follower of the line set by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. But in actuality, Morsi snubbed the troika by proposing a solution to the Syrian crisis by forming a Contact Group comprising Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, which could mediate a Syrian dialogue and reconciliation leading to peaceful political transition in an atmosphere free of violence.

Handshake across Arabia

Of course, Morsi's inclusion of Iran in the proposed Contact Group amounted to a snub to Saudi Arabia, which hosted the OIC summit. Then, there was the body language, which counts heavily in intra-Arab parleys. On the sidelines of the OIC summit, Morsi exchanged handshakes and kisses with Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and spoke with him amidst much manifest warmth.

Tehran promptly welcomed Morsi's proposal, which in turn prompted an appreciation by the Brotherhood in Cairo that saw in Tehran's warm reaction an unmistakable confirmation that Egypt is beginning to regain some of the diplomatic and strategic clout it once held in the region. A sort of mutual admiration society formed between Cairo and Tehran across the arid deserts of the Arabian Peninsula.

Three things emerged from Morsi's performance at the OIC summit. First, Morsi signaled that Egypt intended to pursue a foreign policy that would be independent of Western or oil Gulf countries' agendas. That is to say, Egypt will not meekly follow their footsteps any more or accept an inferior position.

Second, Egypt does not see Turkey as a role model, notwithstanding the high-decibel Western propaganda ever since the Arab Spring appeared that the Islamism of the kind that the present government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan espouses is what the doctor would also prescribe for the ailing Middle East. Erdogan came back from a visit to Cairo last year imagining he was a a rock star for Egyptians, but Morsi apparently doesn't think so.

Third, Morsi's decision to include Iran as a partner in the search for peace in Syria meant a rejection of the Western and Saudi-Turkish approach. On the sidelines of the OIC summit, Egyptian foreign minister Mohammed Amr also met his Iranian counterpart Al Akbar Salehi to urge that Tehran should assist in solving the Syrian crisis.

Indeed, these are early days but Morsi's decision to visit Iran (with which Egypt doesn't have diplomatic relations) can only be seen as a strategic move with profound implications for regional security and global politics. It needs some explanation.

For one thing, Iran is the first Muslim country after Saudi Arabia that Morsi will be visiting in the Middle East. The Arab Street will take note that Egypt's Brothers reject the notion (propagated by Saudi Arabia and the West) of an Iran-led "Shi'ite crescent" posing a threat to the Sunni communities of the Muslim Middle East.

Clearly, Egypt intends to normalize its relations with Iran, whereas Mubarak's Egypt was awash with Manichean fears of Iranian plots to destabilize it. Things have changed. The deputy leader of the Brotherhood, Mahmoud Ezzat, recently told Associated Press, "The old regime used to turn any of his [Mubarak's] rivals to a ghost. We [Brotherhood] don't want to do like Mubarak and exaggerate the fear of Iran."

From Tehran's viewpoint, this comes as a diplomatic and geopolitical breakthrough at a difficult time when the P5+1-Iran talks are in an impasse. Simply put, the Middle Eastern equations have been suddenly thrown into a state of flux. It was all meant to be a neat little logarithm of "Tehran's camp" (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas) versus the "American camp" (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Qatar). But Morsi is nonchalantly crisscrossing that geopolitical barrier.

Could a big shake-up of regional politics be under way? At a minimum, the kaleidoscope is shifting and all of a sudden it seems that the situations in Syria, Lebanon or Gaza might be fraught with new possibilities. (By the way, Morsi made it clear at the OIC summit that any focus on the Syrian crisis should not detract attention from the Palestinian problem, which is the core issue for the Muslim world.)

The big question is what is prompting Egypt's Brotherhood? The conventional wisdom is that the Brothers are a cautious lot and will take their own sweet time to reset the power calculus in Cairo, leave alone tamper with the compass of Egypt's foreign policy. But through the past eight-day period, a different picture of the Brothers has begun emerging. What explains it?

No return to Mubarak era

In retrospect, Morsi's crackdown on the military a week ago was a pre-emptive coup. The Brothers estimated that their best bet would be to ride the wave of high expectations in the public opinion favoring fundamental changes in national policies and that any delay and procrastination in doing so would result in the military gaining the upper hand and turning the tables politically on Morsi's leadership.

Equally, the Brothers harbor distrust of the US' role and its real intentions toward Morsi's leadership. It is useful to remember that the Brotherhood (and Hamas) pointedly accused Israel's Mossad of being responsible for the terrorist strike in Sinai on August 5.

What made the Brothers come to this conclusion is unclear, but Sinai has been a lawless land for decades and it is inconceivable that Israeli intelligence paid no attention to the Islamist militant groups present there. In fact, what really happened on August 5 remains anybody's guess and it needs a willing suspension of disbelief to accept that the Bedouins could mount such a highly professional operation.

Besides, something else was jarring. The terrorist strike in Sinai followed Morsi's meetings with the Hamas leadership in Cairo and his decision to partially ease the restrictions at the Rafah crossing (which of course made a mockery of Israel's "blockade" of Gaza.

Be that as it may, the attack in Sinai came even as the US was piling pressure on Morsi to optimally resuscitate the Mubarak-era security and military tie-ups between Cairo, Washington and Tel Aviv. Both Clinton and Panetta tried hard to persuade Morsi to recapture the spirit of the tripartite US-Egypt-Israel security cooperation over Sinai.

But the Brothers would see that any such reversion to Mubarak-era policies towards Israel would be deeply resented by the Egyptian public - Islamists and "secularists alike - and in turn discredit the Brotherhood and erode the credibility of Morsi's presidency - in sum, it will be suicidal politically. The Brothers would also know that any configuration of Egypt's regional strategies with the locus resting on terrorism would preclude all possibilities of any creative policy rethink on Gaza.

In sum, Morsi's decision to open a line to Beijing and Tehran needs to be weighed against a big backdrop. The Brothers apprehend a US-Israeli plan to destabilize Morsi's government if it doesn't fall in line with Washington's diktat. Therefore, they are looking for ways and means to whittle down the current level of Egypt's over-dependence on the US and its Persian-Gulf allies by diversifying the country's external relationships and adding countervailing partnerships that would help enhance the country's strategic autonomy.

Next week promises to be a defining moment in Middle Eastern politics and inter-Arab alignments when Morsi travels to Beijing and Tehran. With Egypt drifting away, the US' regional strategies are in great disarray. The immediate question will be what is gained, after all, by conquering Damascus with such mindless brutal violence and bestiality if Cairo and Baghdad have already been lost.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

ISRAEL MUST ADJUST ITS POLICY TO EGYPT'S CHANGING REALITY

The first round of elections to Egypt's parliament, which begins today, is the first democratic outcome of the revolution. As such, it presents a historic challenge to the Egyptian people.

28 November 2011, EDITORIAL Haaretz הארץ (Israel)

The first round of elections to Egypt's parliament, which begins today, is the first democratic outcome of the revolution. As such, it presents a historic challenge to the Egyptian people, who had been educated for decades to see elections as an asset of their rulers rather than a whip in the people's hands or a means to build the desired regime.

Egypt's citizens need no lessons in democracy or liberal values. Before the Free Officers Revolution, which saddled Egypt with a number of dictators, that country knew what broad public discourse and liberal values were, and its thinkers knew how to fight based on values, not only politics. The 2011 revolution hinges on this historical awareness, which now draws its strength from the recognition of the people's power and the need to bend the regime, any regime, to their will. Egypt's citizens deserve congratulations for this success and all assistance as they pave their way to a democratic state to be molded according to their will.

Of course, this great transformation is also a source of great concern. Will the parliamentary elections go smoothly until the presidential elections in June? Won't the defeat of many movements in the elections generate violent struggles? How will the new regime put together an economic program that will meet Egypt's urgent needs and prevent it from collapsing even before it embarks on its new path? And what will the new regime's foreign policy be?

These are legitimate concerns, but it's too early and unnecessary to break out the horror scenarios. In Israel and elsewhere, anxiety has developed over the Muslim Brotherhood, but we must remember that Egyptian secular leftist movements also see Israel as a menace, an occupier and a representative of colonialism. The attitude to Israel does not necessarily depend on a religious perception, but rather the understanding that Israel has caused injustice to the people it has occupied.

Thus, for now, it would be deceptive to say the Muslim Brotherhood or Islam in general were responsible for the change in attitude toward Israel. Israel must recognize that the region's political and social reality is changing. It would do well to consider how to adjust its policy to the change instead of lamenting the change itself.

קראו כתבה זו בעברית: בחירות במצרים, אתגר לישראל

CRISES WITH TURKEY AND EGYPT REPRESENT A POLITICAL TSUNAMI FOR ISRAEL

10 September 2011, Haaretz הארץ (Israel)

The political crisis has become a reality well before the Palestinians declare their independent state, writes Haaretz editor-in-chief Aluf Benn, leaving Israel isolated in facing Iran, Turkey and Egypt.

By Aluf Benn

The anxiety caused by the Arab Spring among the Israeli public became a reality this weekend, when protesters broke into the Israeli Embassy in Cairo, and expelled the Israeli diplomats from their country.

The embassy staff’s urgent evacuation in a special IAF plane in the wake of President Obama’s intervention is a stark reminder of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Seven months after the downfall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, Egyptian protesters tore to shreds the Israeli flag, a symbol of peace between Egypt and its eastern neighbor, after 31 years. It seems that the flag will not return to the flagstaff anytime soon.

The historians who will write about the collapse of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty will start their stories during the twilight years of the Mubarak regime, when the government gradually lost control over the Sinai Peninsula, turning the desert into an abandoned frontier of weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and African refugees.

The demilitarization agreements, which removed the Egyptian army from Sinai and were slowly eroded following Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip, have accelerated sharply in the last several months. Time after time, Egypt requested and received permission to “temporarily” deploy more troops and weaponry along the border, in order to restore order and security in the region.

For the Egyptians, this was an opportunity to shake off the limitations imposed on them by the peace agreement, and regain their full sovereignty over the buffer zone that lies between the Suez Canal and the Negev.

In the 70s, when the peace accords were signed, the Egyptian military’s presence in Sinai posed a great security threat. Now, Egyptian soldiers seem like the lesser evil and an antidote to the much larger threat of a political and security vacuum across the border.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is concerned that the Sinai Peninsula will turn into a larger version of the Gaza Strip, full of weapons and launching pads aimed at Israeli territory. The fence that Israel is building along the Egyptian border is intended to ensure routine security measures aimed at preventing terrorists and refugees from spilling over the border. Israel will not be able to handle the strategic dangers that are bound to unfold on the other side.

The “embassy crisis” exploded in the wake of the killing of five Egyptian soldiers on August 18 during a border skirmish that came on the heels of a terrorist attack against Israeli civilians on their way to Eilat.

The Tahrir protesters and Egyptian politicians, frustrated with the slow pace of regime change, have directed their anger toward the most hated target in Cairo – the Israeli Embassy. Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s public expression of regret, and the Israeli promises to cooperate with Egypt in investigating the incident did not interest the Egyptian public.

The protests continued, and a week after the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Ankara on similar grounds - anger stemming from the killing of Turkish citizens aboard last year’s Gaza flotilla – the Israeli ambassador was expelled from Cairo. The only difference is that in Turkey, the government initiated the downgrading of ties, while in Egypt the people did so against the will of their rulers.

Netanyahu and his government have prided themselves on their steadfast commitment to national ideals, and the prime minster is convinced that he was right in refusing to apologize to the Turks for killing their citizens. According to his perspective, the Arab world scrutinizes Israel’s actions, and an apology to Turkey would be interpreted as a sign of unforgivable weakness.

But Netanyahu was not content with merely refusing to apologize. Instead of attempting to calm the conflict with Turkey, Israel was dragged into a dangerous battle with Ankara.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to send a Turkish naval fleet to accompany the next flotillas to Gaza, and Netanyahu responded with a widely-covered visit to an Israeli naval base. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who consistently outflanks Netanyahu from the right, suggests, publicly, that Israel aid the PKK Kurdish insurgency, in order to balance out Turkey’s support for Hamas.

Netanyahu and Lieberman are heroes of the media, but when the chips are down, it turns out that Israel has direct influence on Egypt. Thus, Netanyahu must resort to asking for help from Obama, his great opponent, in order to evacuate the embassy employees. Once again, it becomes clear that Israel cannot manage without help from the United States.

Netanyahu now hopes that Israel might be able to get close with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, who also seek to block the possibility of an Arab Spring in the region. In the West, Netanyahu is hoping to circumvent Turkey by strengthening ties with Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. During his visit to the Balkans, he was shown photos and statues of national heros, sent to their deaths by the Ottoman Empire. A real basis for friendship.

These are but minor comforts. The political tsunami that Ehud Barak foresaw has come true prior to the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state in the UN. Israel is left isolated facing Iran, Turkey and Egypt, which in the past were considered close allies. Netanyahu is convinced that the Arab Spring uprisings are a decree of fate, leaving Israel with little to do but to stand firmly in its place.

Israel cannot prevent the rise of Erdogan or the fall of Mubarak, the same way that it cannot halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The fall of the American superpower is not Netanyahu’s fault. But he has not done a thing to mitigate the fallout from the aforementioned developments. Israel’s political and strategic positions are far worse under his leadership.

More on this topic
• Obama expresses 'great concern' to Netanyahu over Israeli Embassy attack
• Israeli diplomatic staff and families evacuated after Egyptians storm embassy in Cairo
• Arab Spring succeeded, it's Egypt that failed

EGYPT UNREST, TURKEY ROW DEEPEN ISRAELI ISOLATION

10 September 2011, AFP

Al Ahram Online http://english.ahram.org.eg (Egypt)

Fractured diplomatic relations with Egypt and Turkey leave Israel increasingly isolated ahead of Palestinian moves to seek UN recognition

Already embroiled in a fierce diplomatic row with former ally Turkey, Israel found itself in fresh crisis Saturday with southern neighbour Egypt after crowds entered and trashed its Cairo embassy.

Israel has few friends in the Muslim world, and the chill on two fronts further deepens its isolation ahead of Palestinian plans to seek full membership in the United Nations.

The overnight attack on the Cairo diplomatic mission, in which crowds smashed through an external security wall, tossed embassy papers from balconies and tore down the Israeli flag, was the worst since Israel set up its mission in Egypt, the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Tel Aviv, in 1979.Along with Jordan it is still one of only two Arab states to host an Israeli ambassador.

Since former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's ouster in February following a popular revolt, activists have called for a revision of the peace treaty with Israel.

"The mob attack on the Israeli embassy is a serious incident," Israeli news website Ynet on Saturday quoted Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu as saying.

"It was a painful blow to the peace between us and a grave violation of diplomatic norms," an Israeli official told AFP on condition of anonymity, adding that a senior diplomat stayed behind in Egypt after the ambassador and his staff were evacuated, to maintain delicate ties with Egypt.

"We left the deputy ambassador to keep up contact with the Egyptian government," the official said.Israeli army radio said the remaining diplomat was "in a safe place."

"Peace between Israel and Egypt is a strategic interest of both countries and must be maintained despite the angry mob on the streets," Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livni told Ynet.

Egypt declared a state of alert after police clashed with protesters who raided the building housing Israel's embassy.It was the latest episode in worsening relations between Egypt and Israel since the killing of five Egyptian policemen last month on their common border as Israel hunted alleged militants after a deadly attack.

Zvi Mazel, a former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, said that military ruler and current de facto head of state Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi was out of touch with grassroots demonstrators."It's a situation of total anarchy where there is nobody on the military committee, General Tantawi or his friends, who can go to the Egyptian people and say 'Enough, finish, we have a problem. We have to revive the economy, move forward'," Mazel told public radio.

"The Egyptian interim military government is weak, unable to have a dialogue with the Egyptian people," he added.

Israel's latest Egyptian woes came hard on the heels of the worst exchange yet with Turkey, after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Thursday threatened to send warships to escort any Turkish vessels trying to breach Israel's naval blockade of the Gaza Strip.

On Friday, Netanyahu's office said that the cabinet had considered various responses to a further worsening of already stormy relations with Turkey, but had not taken action."Israel acts and will act responsibly and hopes that Turkey will also act in the same way," it said in a statement.

Israel and Turkey have been locked in a bitter dispute since May 2010 when Israeli naval commandos stormed a convoy of six ships trying to reach Gaza in defiance of the blockade, killing nine Turks.The crisis deepened over the past week with Turkey expelling the Israeli ambassador and axing military ties and defence trade.

The United States on Friday sought to calm the situation between two of its allies."We're urging both sides to refrain from provocative action," said State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland.

The worst may be yet to come for Israel on the diplomatic front, as the Palestinians plan to make their bid for membership in the United Nations later this month.They are to announce soon if they will apply to the Security Council to become a full member of the UN or seek recognition by the General Assembly.

Israel opposes both options but acknowledges that the Palestinians are likely to win majority support in the General Assembly.

NO EVIDENCE FOR POPULAR RESISTANCE COMMITTEES INVOLVEMENT IN ATTACKS

25 August 2011, + 972 http://972mag.com (Israel)

Yossi Gurvitz*

A week passed since the Eilat attack, and the IDF has yet to prove the blame of the group Israel chose to attack in response.

Earlier this week I posted about the cracks in the Barak-Netanyahu narrative regarding the terror attacks near Eilat. A quick reminder: While the attacks were still going on, Barak blamed them on the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza, and hours later the IAF attacked and killed the leadership of the PRC. However, there is not a shred of evidence the PRC had anything to do with the attacks, and Barak’s action plunged Israel and Hamas into a new round of hostilities.

Since Monday, there have been a few more reports in the Israeli media, casting more doubt on the official story. Yediot reported on Tuesday (Hebrew) that nameless people in the security apparatus doubt the PRC were responsible for the attacks, and raise an interesting question: If they were responsible, why was the PRC’s entire leadership in the same place?

According to Yediot’s anonymous intelligence sources (bear in mind that such sources should always be viewed with skepticism; by their very nature they cannot be corroborated, and they tend to be unreliable even when speaking openly), the attribution of the attacks to the PRC stems from one somewhat incoherent comment on some Jihadi message board.

Ha’aretz reported on Tuesday (Hebrew) that at least three on the attackers were Egyptian Jihadis. American intelligence sources – the same caveat above applies here – told Globes (Hebrew) that they, too, doubt the PRC are responsible, though they may have had a small role in the attacks.

Two days ago, the IAF attacked the Gaza Strip again – naturally, it does not consider itself bound by the ceasefire; only the Palestinians are, and only them can be blamed for breaking it – and killed some Islamic Jihad apparatchick. Yesterday, the IDF claimed (Hebrew) that he was in charge of funding the Eilat attacks. Hold on a minute, I’m confused: I thought you said the attacks were carried out by the PRC, and now it’s the Islamic Jihad left holding the bag? As of yesterday, reported Amira Hass in Ha’aretz (Hebrew), there are no mourning tents in Gaza. As of today, one week after the attack, the IDF refrains from exposing the identity of the attackers it killed.

One should note that none of the bewildering array of information comes officially from the IDF Spokesman, but rather from all sorts of “senior sources”. That’s the way the IDF raises a smokescreen, and then, when it is penetrated, rightly say he said nothing official. Lt. Col. Avital Leibowitz was adamant, during a phone call on Sunday, that all of the people involved in the attacks were Gazans; unofficially, the IDF seems to back away from this position.

Despite the ceasefire, the IDF renewed attacks on the Gaza Strip, and the Israeli media – aside from Netanyahu’s mouthpiece, Israel Ha’yom – quietly points that out. This low level of military activity suits barak fine: It prevents a serious escalation, which may deal a blow to the Egyptian peace treaty – the Egyptians have warned the cabinet, it is reported, from a full-scale offensive (Hebrew) – and yet allows the government a distraction from the demands of the #J14 movement.
And if a few Gazans die, who cares?

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I am Yossi Gurvitz*, a 40-year old journalist, blogger and photographer.

I write for several Israeli publications, including the influential financial daily Calcalist and the Nana portal. In the past, I’ve been deputy editor of Nana News, and with Itamar Shaaltiel edited its 2006 Knesset elections section.

I was raised as an Orthodox Jew, graduated from a Yeshiva (Nehalim), but saw the light and turned atheist at about the age of 17. After the mandatory three years in the military, much more strictly enforced in 1988 than now, I studied history and classics, earning a BA degree, and studying three additional years towards an MA, but abandoned the project in favor of earning my living as a journalist. [It seemed a good idea at the time.]

ISRAEL’S NICE LITTLE WAR

25 August 2011, CounterPunch http://www.counterpunch.org (USA)

Gaza, Egypt in the Range of Fire

by Ramzy Baroud*

Israeli writer Uri Avnery recently wrote an article entitled ‘How Godly Are Thy Tents?’, which began with the words, “First of all, a warning.” The reference was made to the tent cities that have sprung up across the country by middle class Israelis demanding change and reforms. The organizational style of these demands was not entirely different from Arab uprisings. To everyone’s surprise, the limited Israeli mobilization, which extended from concerns about sky-rocketing real estate prices to calls for ‘social justice’, was seen as Israel’s Tahrir Square moment. The movement was yet to articulate a political agenda, although such enunciation would have been a natural progression.

So what was Avnery’s warning about?

The “social protest movement is gathering momentum,” wrote Avnery. “At that point, there will be a temptation – perhaps an irresistible temptation – to ‘warm up the borders’. To start a nice little war. Call on the youth of Israel, the same young people now manning…the tents, to go and defend the fatherland.”

It was an unnerving warning, not only because it came from Avnery, a veteran well-versed in his understanding of the Israel ruling class, but also because it actualized in its entirety a few days later.

The ‘war’ had indeed commenced, starting on August 18. The ‘provocation’ had supposedly demonstrated without doubt that Israel’s security was greatly compromised and that the small state with ‘indefensible borders’ was paying a high price for Gaza’s armed intransigence and Egypt’s post-revolutionary chaos. Israeli sources reported that a large number of militants had crossed Sinai into Israel’s Red Sea resort of Eilat on Thursday (August 18), opening fire on two buses carrying Israeli soldiers. The passage was implacably coordinated, thus the ability of these bold attackers to kill and wound soldiers and other Israelis. According to the Israeli version of events, some of the attackers were killed, but others managed to flee back to Egypt. This forced the Israeli military to pursue them in an extraordinary chase, which mistakenly killed three Egyptian military personal.

Israeli sources, seemingly clueless to the armed men’s infiltration of a high security area, immediately provided precise information about the attackers. Instant consensus was also reached about the attackers’ link to Gaza. Per the massive strikes on many Gaza targets, it seemed as though the entire Strip was being blamed and punished.

The outcome was most predictable, albeit tragic. Israeli warplanes flew back over the Gaza sky, drones roamed uncontested, and the Palestinian death toll augmented. The whole miserable scene of killed civilians, mutilated children and burnt buildings was once more upon us. The chorus of support for Israel and condemnation of Palestinians from Washington was reminiscent of a history that never stops repeating itself.

But before delving into counter-arguments, one is tempted to question the conveniently situated Israeli wars of ‘self defense.’ How different is this latest ‘nice little war’ from the horrifying Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982? When Ariel Sharon requested an American green light to attack Lebanon, Alexander Haig, US Secretary of State under President Ronald Reagan, insisted Israel must possess a ‘credible provocation’ before leading such a mission. Moreover, the case made to justify the war on Gaza in 2008-09 Operation Cast Lead also had its own ‘credible provocation’. In fact, all of Israel’s wars are sold to the public within this neat package which actually holds little credibility.

This time the provocation had to be convincing enough to justify multiple Israeli strikes on all of Gaza’s factions, as well as politically vulnerable Egypt.

Why is Israel bent on discrediting Egypt, exploiting the most sensitive period of its modern history, and destabilizing the border area so as to show Egypt’s failure to ensure Israel’s border security, as stipulated in the Camp David treaty?

Reportedly, all of Gaza’s prominent factions denied any responsibility for the Eilat attacks, including the Popular Resistance Committees (not affiliated with Hamas), which was accused by Israeli of being behind the attacks.

Responding to Israel’s killing of Egyptian officers, and under pressure by thousands of porters, Egypt pulled its ambassador out of Israel on August 20. In Israel, the discussion is now shifting to security and the need to complete construction of its 200km barrier at the border with Egypt, ostensibly aimed at blocking African immigrants from sneaking into Israel. Strangely, Egypt, which stands accused of allowing hundreds of militants into Israel from Sinai, had kept an eye on the border despite the effects of the revolution on security throughout the country. On July 7, for example, and on August 11, Egyptian security reportedly killed an Eritrean man and a Sudan migrant respectively for trying to cross the border. Many others have been apprehended during past months as well.

The army’s ability to strike down lone migrants, while supposed laxity allowed for the infiltration of hundreds in one instance raises more questions than it provides answers.

Some hidden hands seem to be orchestrating chaos in the city of Arish and the rest of the Sinai area. This includes the peculiar daytime attack by hundreds of armed met at police stations in Arish on July 29, which killed several Egyptian officers.
While deliberate chaos was being engendered in Sinai, fear was returning to Gaza as it was promised another Israeli military assault.

On August 9, residents of the impoverished Gaza Strip feared attack by Israel. The fears were not only based on repeated threats by Israeli officials, but also on a mysterious telecommunication blackout that day which cut off all Internet, mobile phones and international landlines for hours, according to Ma’an news agency. “Meanwhile, residents of Gaza near the border with Israel said army bulldozers were seen operating shortly before communications went offline,” Ma’an reported.

Why did Israel cut Gaza’s communication off? Was the ‘credible provocation’ being concocted then? Why did Israel fail to provide a reasonable explanation for the blackout? More, why the attempt at embarrassing, provoking and perhaps dragging Egypt into a border confrontation at a time when Egypt is attempting a transition towards democracy?

It ought to be said that “new Egypt’ was also credited for facilitating Palestinian unity, a first step towards taking Hamas out of its international isolation.

Is it not then possible that Israel’s ‘nice little war’ was a response to such a dangerous shift in Egyptian policy towards Hamas – and Palestine in general?

*Ramzy Baroud is editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many newspapers and journals worldwide. He is the author of The Second Palestinian Intifada: a Chronicle of a People’s Struggle and “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” (Pluto Press, London).