7 September 2011, World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org (Australia)
Nearly half a million people poured into the streets of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and towns and cities across Israel on Saturday to raise the banner of “social justice” and protest against low wages and the rising costs of housing, food, transportation, education and other basic social necessities that are rendering life intolerable for the majority of the population.
Fueling the mass anger behind these protests is Israel’s ever-increasing social inequality that has handed huge profits to a handful of billionaire “tycoons,” even as millions face social deprivation. It is widely recognized that the policies of the right-wing regime of Benyamin Netanyahu are dictated by the interests and demands of a tiny plutocracy.
The sheer scale of the protests Saturday—encompassing 5.5 percent of Israel’s population of 7.75 million, the equivalent of 18 million people protesting in the US—underscores the movement’s profound historical significance.
More than six decades after the founding of the Israeli state, following continuous wars against neighboring Arab countries and more than 44 years of occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the demonstrations have served to undermine a central Zionist myth. They have exposed the fact that in Israel, as in every other country, it is the class question that is fundamental, not nationality, race, religion or ethnicity.
Moreover, Jewish workers in Israel are responding to the same historic crisis of global capitalism that produced the mass revolts that have swept the Middle East, toppling the Western-backed dictatorships of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt. Many of the protesters who pitched tents on Tel Aviv’s Rothschild Boulevard and took to the streets of other towns and cities compared themselves to the Egyptian masses who occupied Tahrir Square.
This involves the embryonic consciousness that workers in Israel, just like in Egypt, are entering into a struggle that is international in its scope and that cannot be resolved within the confines of the national borders dividing the Middle East.
However, those in the leadership of these protests along with the Zionist union federation, Histadrut, which has backed them, and the various pseudo-left organizations that follow in its wake are determined to divert this movement back into the safe channels of Israel’s existing political setup.
This has been the significance from the outset of the insistence of the protests’ organizers on “no politics.” It had the same significance as similar proscriptions offered by the organizers of protests by Spain’s indignados: reinforcing the domination of the existing politics of the parties of the ruling elite and their servants in the union bureaucracy.
The leaders of the protest, together with the bureaucracy of Histadrut, have explicitly rejected any struggle to bring down the Netanyahu government. Instead, they have indicated their willingness to negotiate with this government, the most right-wing in Israel’s history, which has formed a committee for the purpose of presenting some cosmetic “reforms” based on moving around spending within the exiting Israeli budget, while leaving untouched the existing system of capitalist exploitation and social inequality.
In Israel, of course, the proscription of politics has additional and even more fatal implications. It excludes from a struggle waged in the name of equality and social justice the deep social oppression arising from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza; the fate of the millions of Palestinian refugees driven from their land; and the unequal status of Israel’s Arabs, 20 percent of the population, under a state that defines itself as Jewish.
It also leaves this movement defenseless in the face of the Netanyahu government’s invocation of alleged threats to Israel and appeals for Zionist unity to stifle social unrest. Netanyahu even exploited the protests over housing prices as the pretext to push ahead with more Zionist settlements around occupied East Jerusalem.
Finally, it prevents any real challenge to the vast diversion of social wealth into maintaining Israel’s massive military complex, which serves to intimidate the Palestinian people and all the countries of the Middle East.
In the wake of the fatal ambushes near the Sinai border last month, the following weekend’s protests were called off by the organizers. And it appears that the huge demonstrations last Saturday will not be repeated.
The decision to wind up this movement in September is hardly an accident. It coincides with a steady drumbeat of warnings from the Netanyahu government that the attempt this month by the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to secure recognition from the United Nations of Palestinian statehood will be accompanied by widespread violence.
As Israel’s reactionary foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, put it recently, “The Palestinian Authority is planning a bloodbath.”
In reality, it is the Israeli military apparatus that is preparing for a bloodbath and a new round of war. There is no evidence that Palestinian workers and youth see the bourgeois Palestinian leadership’s maneuvers at the UN as of vital import. This UN resolution will do no more to better their conditions than all the ones that have preceded it. And even if the UN were to grant statehood—which it will not—a national entity created on the irrational and economically unviable borders left by the carve-up of Palestine would resolve none of the social and democratic demands of the Palestinian people.
The Israeli regime makes such threats because it fears above all the undermining of the ideological basis of its rule, and an explosion of the class struggle throughout the Middle East. To forestall the threat of a unified struggle of the Jewish and Arab working class against imperialism, it is willing to take the most desperate and reckless measures, including war—a situation that highlights the deep political significance of a struggle to unify the workers of the Middle East.
The mass protests in Israel have shown that there exists the objective basis in the Israeli working class for such a policy. However, carrying forward these struggles against the ruling class’s policy of social reaction and war requires elaborating a new political program and forging new mass organizations of the working class on the perspective of socialist internationalism. This means building sections of the International Committee of the Fourth International in Israel and Palestine, in Egypt, Tunisia and throughout the region, committed to a common fight a Socialist Federation of the Middle East.
Mostrando postagens com marcador Al Fatah. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Al Fatah. Mostrar todas as postagens
quinta-feira, 8 de setembro de 2011
sexta-feira, 12 de agosto de 2011
PROTESTOS EM ISRAEL INFLUENCIADOS PELO MUNDO ÁRABE
12 Agosto 2011, Carta Maior http://www.cartamaior.com.br (Brasil)
Líderes sociais palestinos acreditam que Israel está “inadvertidamente” se tornando parte do Oriente Médio, embora haja pouco interesse palestino nos protestos que eclodiram ao longo de Israel nas últimas semanas. Como cidadã israelense, nascida em Maria e Diretora Geral do Fórum Palestino de Estudos Israelenses, a socióloga Honaida Ghanim acredita que os acontecimentos recentes na Tunísia e no Egito tiveram um grande impacto no movimento de protesto israelense. O artigo é de Amira Hass.
Amira Hass
Haaretz, Data: 09/08/2011
Líderes sociais palestinos acreditam que os protestos sociais que eclodiram ao longo de Israel são fortemente influenciados pela primavera árabe, e que os militantes israelenses devem entender que eles também estão sofrendo com a ocupação e o dinheiro gasto em assentamentos na Cisjordânia.
Os israelenses estão imitando o mundo árabe, e os palestinos da Cisjordânia acreditam que isso é uma coisa boa. De acordo com a agência de notícias Ma’na, 14,032 (quase 75%) dos 18, 722 leitores que responderam a sua pesquisa online acreditam que o que está acontecendo nas ruas de Israel é influenciado e está imitando a “primavera árabe”.
“Israel está inadvertidamente se tornando parte do Oriente Médio”, disse a socióloga Honaida Ghanim, que pesquisa a sociedade israelense, acrescentando que “este é o poder do ativismo das bases sociais, quando os ideólogos do país não são consultados”.
Ghanim não se surpreendeu quando os protestos começaram. Como cidadã israelense, nascida em Maria e Diretora Geral do MADAR, o Fórum Palestino de Estudos Israelenses, a socióloga está bem familiarizada com a polarização israelense. No entanto, está certa de que os acontecimentos recentes na Tunísia e no Egito tiveram um grande impacto no movimento de protesto israelense.
Sufian Abu Zaida é membro do Fatah e ex-prisioneiro, que atualmente dá aulas sobre a sociedade israelense na Universidade Birzeit e na Universidade Aberta Al-Quds. Ele nasceu em Jabaliya, um campo de refugiados na Faixa de Gaza, de uma família de refugiados da cidade de Burayr (atualmente Bror Hayil).
O professor palestino lembra de rememorar os seus alunos no ano que vem desta “que pode ser a primeira coisa que os israelenses aprenderam com os árabes. Eles sempre se apresentaram como o único raio de luz positiva na escuridão do Oriente Médio. De repente há algo a ser aprendido com esses retardados”.
Ghanim cita fatores sociológicos adicionais como parte do ímpeto por mudança em Israel, dizendo que “por um lado, há o neoliberalismo e a globalização, que resultaram num inaceitável vão entre a riqueza do estado e dos indivíduos e a aspereza da vida da maioria das pessoas. Por outro, há essas ferramentas similares – redes sociais online, com o Facebook liderando a lista, que têm um alcance muito maior na mídia”.
Mesmo assim, não há muito interesse dos palestinos nos protestos que tomaram as ruas de Israel por três semanas. “Somos um povo em luta permanente com o governo, três semanas de protesto não são o suficiente para prender a nossa atenção”, disse Nariman al-Tamimi, de Nabi Salih, e Afat Ghatasha, uma militante feminista e membro do Partido do Povo Palestino.
No entanto, ambas estão impressionadas – assim como outros palestinos – com o fato de que o movimento israelense defende a melhoria do já alto padrão de vida em Israel, em comparação aos dos palestinos. O que os israelenses estão exigindo “é luxo”, de acordo com Ghatasha.
“Eu sei algo a respeito da crise de moradia”, disse Tamimi, que foi erroneamente posta numa prisão por oito dias, há um ano e meio atrás, por ter atacado um policial com um objeto cortante. Ela veio a ser condenada por “obstruir o trabalho do policial na realização de seus deveres”, durante uma manifestação contra a apropriação de terras e de um poço de água na cidade.
Seu marido Bassam foi preso há quatro meses e enfrenta a acusação de organizar manifestações de protesto em sua cidade. “Para nós, palestinos, não é uma crise de moradia que estamos enfrentando, mas um banimento de moradia, embora a responsabilidade do governo israelense por ambas as situações seja um denominador comum”, disse ela.
A Administração Civil lançou uma ordem de demolição para a sua casa, construída na Área C. A casa original, construída em 1963, não era grande o suficiente para a família inteira e eles tiveram de ampliar a sua casa sem uma permissão: uma permissão que Israel não deu.
De sua casa, que poderá ser destruída a qualquer dia, os membros da família podem ver o assentamento de Halamish se erguer. “Há poucos dias, minha filha viu os manifestantes israelenses comigo, enquanto eu navegava na web”, disse Tamimi, “quando nos reunimos no escritório do Comitê Popular de Resistência al-Bireh”.
“Ela me perguntou: eles também são dispersados com bombas de gás, eles são atingidos? Eu lhe disse que não, não eram. Ela não podia entender a diferença; nós também estamos lutando por justiça social, não estamos?”, disse Tamimi.
O principal elemento faltante na onda israelense de protestos, de acordo com Tamimi é a desconexão entre a luta social e a ocupação israelense.
Abu Zaida é o único que parece otimista quanto aos protestos, dizendo que “as pessoas vão começar a julgar o seu governo nos seus gastos com os assentamentos e os assentados. Está para acontecer isso. Justiça Social significa uma distribuição igualitária dos recursos do país. Todo mundo sabe que não é isso o que está ocorrendo por razões políticas e ideológicas”.
Ghanim, no entanto, acredita que os movimentos de protesto israelenses fracassarão porque os bons modos políticos impedirão as pessoas de verem a ligação natural com a ocupação, com o governo continuando a fazer dos assentamentos a mais alta prioridade, desprovendo o povo palestino de sua liberdade.
“O movimento é liderado pela classe média e por muitos intelectuais, uma classe social que gera muito conhecimento no sentido sociológico, mas no sentido espiritual, disse Ghanim, acrescentando “eles eventualmente vão estabelecer uma conexão com a ocupação. No entanto, historicamente processos estratégicos levam muito tempo, enquanto a liderança tem pouco tempo em mente, sem tratar da raiz do problema. E assim o movimento vai colapsar. Netanyahu trará a Cisjordânia a Tel Aviv, quer dizer, ele vai fazer um upgrade no apartheid, e isso é tudo”.
Tamimi e Ghatash acreditam que esta é uma oportunidade para os israelenses entenderem que também são vítimas da ocupação. “Todas as granadas e bombas a gás jogadas sobre nós nas nossas manifestações custam dinheiro que não pode ser gasto para melhorar as condições dos israelenses”, disse Tamimi. Mesmo assim, afirmou, ela ouviu que um dos líderes dos protestos falou contra os anarquistas, porque eles protestaram contra os soldados.
“Eles são ativistas que lutam conosco nos últimos anos”, disse ela. “Como você pode exigir justiça social para apenas um grupo?”.
Ghatasha, que nasceu no campo de refugiados de al-Fawwar, numa família da cidade palestina despovoada Bayt Jibrin, também se viu inclinada a não enxergar diferença alguma que tenha sacudido o país.
Em maio passado ela se encontrou com ativistas da esquerda israelense que vieram para uma conferência de partidos da esquerda palestina, em Hebron. Na conferência ela falou sobre os dois processos impedirem as atividades feministas palestinas e a participação das mulheres na luta contra a ocupação.
Por um lado, disse, a ação das ongs (a canalização das atividades das ongs fundadas em diversos países) reduz a influência dos grupos de mulheres. Por outro, a militarização da segunda intifada afastou a maior parte da população, inclusive mulheres, da esfera da luta política.
“O que é isso que faz com que alguns israelenses tenham e outros, não?”, pensou ela, na festa em seu gabinete em Hebron. “Eu queria entender a racionalidade do povo israelense”, acrescentou. “Por um lado há esse egoísmo de um povo vivendo sobre a miséria de outro, sem lamento. Por outro, é óbvio que eles estariam melhor se vivessem num país normal, sem desperdiçar seu dinheiro na sustentação da ocupação, disse Ghatasha.
A despeito de seus receios, todos os quatro concordam que o protesto permitirá aos palestinos – a maior parte dos quais só conhece os israelenses dos assentamentos e os soldados – a verem que “a sociedade israelense não é unidimensional, que é complexa, que não deve ser tomada monoliticamente, que tem suas lutas e suas próprias classes oprimidas”, disse Ghanim.
“O protesto está dilacerando a imagem de Israel como um país perfeito, em que todos são satisfeitos, têm suas vilas e circulam diariamente em seus carros”, acrescentou Abu Zaida.
Tradução: Katarina Peixoto
Líderes sociais palestinos acreditam que Israel está “inadvertidamente” se tornando parte do Oriente Médio, embora haja pouco interesse palestino nos protestos que eclodiram ao longo de Israel nas últimas semanas. Como cidadã israelense, nascida em Maria e Diretora Geral do Fórum Palestino de Estudos Israelenses, a socióloga Honaida Ghanim acredita que os acontecimentos recentes na Tunísia e no Egito tiveram um grande impacto no movimento de protesto israelense. O artigo é de Amira Hass.
Amira Hass
Haaretz, Data: 09/08/2011
Líderes sociais palestinos acreditam que os protestos sociais que eclodiram ao longo de Israel são fortemente influenciados pela primavera árabe, e que os militantes israelenses devem entender que eles também estão sofrendo com a ocupação e o dinheiro gasto em assentamentos na Cisjordânia.
Os israelenses estão imitando o mundo árabe, e os palestinos da Cisjordânia acreditam que isso é uma coisa boa. De acordo com a agência de notícias Ma’na, 14,032 (quase 75%) dos 18, 722 leitores que responderam a sua pesquisa online acreditam que o que está acontecendo nas ruas de Israel é influenciado e está imitando a “primavera árabe”.
“Israel está inadvertidamente se tornando parte do Oriente Médio”, disse a socióloga Honaida Ghanim, que pesquisa a sociedade israelense, acrescentando que “este é o poder do ativismo das bases sociais, quando os ideólogos do país não são consultados”.
Ghanim não se surpreendeu quando os protestos começaram. Como cidadã israelense, nascida em Maria e Diretora Geral do MADAR, o Fórum Palestino de Estudos Israelenses, a socióloga está bem familiarizada com a polarização israelense. No entanto, está certa de que os acontecimentos recentes na Tunísia e no Egito tiveram um grande impacto no movimento de protesto israelense.
Sufian Abu Zaida é membro do Fatah e ex-prisioneiro, que atualmente dá aulas sobre a sociedade israelense na Universidade Birzeit e na Universidade Aberta Al-Quds. Ele nasceu em Jabaliya, um campo de refugiados na Faixa de Gaza, de uma família de refugiados da cidade de Burayr (atualmente Bror Hayil).
O professor palestino lembra de rememorar os seus alunos no ano que vem desta “que pode ser a primeira coisa que os israelenses aprenderam com os árabes. Eles sempre se apresentaram como o único raio de luz positiva na escuridão do Oriente Médio. De repente há algo a ser aprendido com esses retardados”.
Ghanim cita fatores sociológicos adicionais como parte do ímpeto por mudança em Israel, dizendo que “por um lado, há o neoliberalismo e a globalização, que resultaram num inaceitável vão entre a riqueza do estado e dos indivíduos e a aspereza da vida da maioria das pessoas. Por outro, há essas ferramentas similares – redes sociais online, com o Facebook liderando a lista, que têm um alcance muito maior na mídia”.
Mesmo assim, não há muito interesse dos palestinos nos protestos que tomaram as ruas de Israel por três semanas. “Somos um povo em luta permanente com o governo, três semanas de protesto não são o suficiente para prender a nossa atenção”, disse Nariman al-Tamimi, de Nabi Salih, e Afat Ghatasha, uma militante feminista e membro do Partido do Povo Palestino.
No entanto, ambas estão impressionadas – assim como outros palestinos – com o fato de que o movimento israelense defende a melhoria do já alto padrão de vida em Israel, em comparação aos dos palestinos. O que os israelenses estão exigindo “é luxo”, de acordo com Ghatasha.
“Eu sei algo a respeito da crise de moradia”, disse Tamimi, que foi erroneamente posta numa prisão por oito dias, há um ano e meio atrás, por ter atacado um policial com um objeto cortante. Ela veio a ser condenada por “obstruir o trabalho do policial na realização de seus deveres”, durante uma manifestação contra a apropriação de terras e de um poço de água na cidade.
Seu marido Bassam foi preso há quatro meses e enfrenta a acusação de organizar manifestações de protesto em sua cidade. “Para nós, palestinos, não é uma crise de moradia que estamos enfrentando, mas um banimento de moradia, embora a responsabilidade do governo israelense por ambas as situações seja um denominador comum”, disse ela.
A Administração Civil lançou uma ordem de demolição para a sua casa, construída na Área C. A casa original, construída em 1963, não era grande o suficiente para a família inteira e eles tiveram de ampliar a sua casa sem uma permissão: uma permissão que Israel não deu.
De sua casa, que poderá ser destruída a qualquer dia, os membros da família podem ver o assentamento de Halamish se erguer. “Há poucos dias, minha filha viu os manifestantes israelenses comigo, enquanto eu navegava na web”, disse Tamimi, “quando nos reunimos no escritório do Comitê Popular de Resistência al-Bireh”.
“Ela me perguntou: eles também são dispersados com bombas de gás, eles são atingidos? Eu lhe disse que não, não eram. Ela não podia entender a diferença; nós também estamos lutando por justiça social, não estamos?”, disse Tamimi.
O principal elemento faltante na onda israelense de protestos, de acordo com Tamimi é a desconexão entre a luta social e a ocupação israelense.
Abu Zaida é o único que parece otimista quanto aos protestos, dizendo que “as pessoas vão começar a julgar o seu governo nos seus gastos com os assentamentos e os assentados. Está para acontecer isso. Justiça Social significa uma distribuição igualitária dos recursos do país. Todo mundo sabe que não é isso o que está ocorrendo por razões políticas e ideológicas”.
Ghanim, no entanto, acredita que os movimentos de protesto israelenses fracassarão porque os bons modos políticos impedirão as pessoas de verem a ligação natural com a ocupação, com o governo continuando a fazer dos assentamentos a mais alta prioridade, desprovendo o povo palestino de sua liberdade.
“O movimento é liderado pela classe média e por muitos intelectuais, uma classe social que gera muito conhecimento no sentido sociológico, mas no sentido espiritual, disse Ghanim, acrescentando “eles eventualmente vão estabelecer uma conexão com a ocupação. No entanto, historicamente processos estratégicos levam muito tempo, enquanto a liderança tem pouco tempo em mente, sem tratar da raiz do problema. E assim o movimento vai colapsar. Netanyahu trará a Cisjordânia a Tel Aviv, quer dizer, ele vai fazer um upgrade no apartheid, e isso é tudo”.
Tamimi e Ghatash acreditam que esta é uma oportunidade para os israelenses entenderem que também são vítimas da ocupação. “Todas as granadas e bombas a gás jogadas sobre nós nas nossas manifestações custam dinheiro que não pode ser gasto para melhorar as condições dos israelenses”, disse Tamimi. Mesmo assim, afirmou, ela ouviu que um dos líderes dos protestos falou contra os anarquistas, porque eles protestaram contra os soldados.
“Eles são ativistas que lutam conosco nos últimos anos”, disse ela. “Como você pode exigir justiça social para apenas um grupo?”.
Ghatasha, que nasceu no campo de refugiados de al-Fawwar, numa família da cidade palestina despovoada Bayt Jibrin, também se viu inclinada a não enxergar diferença alguma que tenha sacudido o país.
Em maio passado ela se encontrou com ativistas da esquerda israelense que vieram para uma conferência de partidos da esquerda palestina, em Hebron. Na conferência ela falou sobre os dois processos impedirem as atividades feministas palestinas e a participação das mulheres na luta contra a ocupação.
Por um lado, disse, a ação das ongs (a canalização das atividades das ongs fundadas em diversos países) reduz a influência dos grupos de mulheres. Por outro, a militarização da segunda intifada afastou a maior parte da população, inclusive mulheres, da esfera da luta política.
“O que é isso que faz com que alguns israelenses tenham e outros, não?”, pensou ela, na festa em seu gabinete em Hebron. “Eu queria entender a racionalidade do povo israelense”, acrescentou. “Por um lado há esse egoísmo de um povo vivendo sobre a miséria de outro, sem lamento. Por outro, é óbvio que eles estariam melhor se vivessem num país normal, sem desperdiçar seu dinheiro na sustentação da ocupação, disse Ghatasha.
A despeito de seus receios, todos os quatro concordam que o protesto permitirá aos palestinos – a maior parte dos quais só conhece os israelenses dos assentamentos e os soldados – a verem que “a sociedade israelense não é unidimensional, que é complexa, que não deve ser tomada monoliticamente, que tem suas lutas e suas próprias classes oprimidas”, disse Ghanim.
“O protesto está dilacerando a imagem de Israel como um país perfeito, em que todos são satisfeitos, têm suas vilas e circulam diariamente em seus carros”, acrescentou Abu Zaida.
Tradução: Katarina Peixoto
sexta-feira, 22 de julho de 2011
Da prisão, líder palestino convoca milhões às ruas
21 julho 2011/Vermelho http://www.vermelho.org.br (Brasil)
Da prisão israelense de Hadarim – onde cumpre cinco penas de prisão perpétua – o líder palestino Marwan Barghouti pediu ontem que "milhões" saiam às ruas em setembro, em apoio ao pedido de independência palestina, que deve acontecer em setembro, durante a Assembleia Geral da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU).
Crianças palestinas levantam cartaz de Barghouti
Em carta enviada à imprensa, ele incentiva os palestinos nos territórios ocupados por Israel e em outros países a "marchar pacificamente" durante a semana de votação do pedido na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas.
O plano palestino de pedir que a ONU aceite a Palestina como membro da organização deu início a uma disputa diplomática com Israel, que o considera – apoiado por seu aliado norte-americano – um ato unilateral, contrário aos acordos de paz assinados.
Com a paralisação das negociações de paz desde 2008 e sem sinais de que serão retomadas em breve, os palestinos disseram que pedirão na ONU uma votação em favor de sua independência. A aprovação na Assembleia Geral seria simbólica e teria pouco efeito prático, mas os palestinos acreditam que o endosso internacional representaria uma forte pressão para que Israel saia dos territórios ocupados.
O líder Barghouti manteve a influência que conquistou durante o movimento insurgente mesmo após ter sido preso. É frequentemente apontado em pesquisas como um dos favoritos à Presidência palestina.
No texto, ele diz que a ida à ONU é parte de uma nova estratégia palestina que abrirá as portas para mais manifestações. A ideia é reproduzir o espírito das revoluções árabes e acirrar a pressão sobre Israel com o aval da ONU.
"Vencer a batalha de setembro, que é um passo importante de nossa luta, requer os maiores protestos pacíficos aqui e na diáspora, nos países árabes e muçulmanos e nas capitais internacionais", disse Barghouti.
Líder palestino
Barghouti, de 51 anos, talvez seja o mais conhecido líder palestino detido por Israel – e um dos cerca de 10 mil presos políticos o que conflito já fez. Ele cumpre cinco sentenças de prisão perpétua por sua participação em levantes armados na última década. Seu nome sempre é citado quando se discute o futuro político da presidência palestina.
A mulher de Barghouti, Fadwa, afirmou que o marido ditou a mensagem para seus advogados durante uma visita recente. Ainda não está claro como a convocação de Barghouti vai evoluir, já que as manifestações vão depender da organização de ativistas pró-palestinos.
Segundo especialistas, Barghouti vem tendo sua trajetória política comparada a de Nelson Mandela – ativista e ex-presidente da África do Sul. A comparação é surgiu principalmente a partir das declarações do líder baseadas na chamada “resistência pacífica”, como pregava o militante africano. E hoje, mesmo preso, é uma das figuras mais populares da Autoridade Palestina.
Barghouti nasceu em uma aldeia próxima de Ramallah, e se tornou membro do Fatah ainda com 15 anos. Com 18, foi preso pela primeira vez por ter envolvimento com grupos militantes palestinos. Em 1987, atuou como um dos principais líderes da Primeira Intifada, levando os palestinos a protestarem em um levante contra Israel. Em 1996, Barghouti foi eleito para o Conselho Legislativo da Palestina, quando começou sua defesa ativa por um Estado Palestino independente.
Durante a Segunda Intifada, sua popularidade cresceu ainda mais e o líder passou a ser visto como uma das principais forças de combate contra as Forças de Defesa Israelenses. Ao mesmo tempo em que via sua popularidade junto às massas aumentar, o líder palestino exortava ações combativas contra Israel. Em 2001, ele conseguiu se livrar da primeira tentativa de prisão.
Só em abril de 2002, Barghouti foi preso, sob a acusação de assassinato e tentativa de homicídios decorrentes dos movimentos de insurgência popular dos quais participou. Desde que está preso, seus apoiadores – entre eles, autoridades políticas, militantes, membros do parlamento europeu – acreditam que Barghouti é uma espécie de Nelson Mandela palestino, uma vez que é apontado como o líder ideal para reanimar um movimento à deriva e dividido nacionalmente.
Estado palestino
No Brasil, a campanha “Pela Criação do Estado da Palestina Já” está em desenvolvimento e a manifestação é respaldada por cerca de três dezenas de organizações políticas e sociais. A Palestina já é reconhecida política e moralmente por mais de cem países.
A Palestina também foi admitida nas organizações da ONU, com exceção da Organização das Nações Unidas para a Educação, a Ciência e a Cultura (Unesco) e da Organização Mundial de Saúde (OMS). E o presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, em pronunciamento feito em maio deste ano, admitiu a criação do Estado palestino com as fronteiras de 1967.
O ministro da Defesa de Israel, Ehud Barak, comparou a eventual decisão da ONU em favor dos palestinos a um “tsunami”. O novo embaixador de Israel na ONU, Ron Prosor, informou à imprensa israelense que o reconhecimento da Palestina por parte da ONU “levaria à violência e à guerra”.
Em 1947, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) criou o Plano de Partilha da Palestina, que resultou na criação do Estado de Israel. Essa iniciativa abriu caminho para uma tragédia cotidiana para o povo palestino. Mais de 500 vilas e comunidades palestinas foram destruídas. Milhares foram presos, torturados e assassinados.
Palestinos foram expulsos de suas casas e de centenas de cidades. Cerca de 4,5 milhões de refugiados palestinos vivem hoje pelo mundo, sendo que a maioria destes se encontra nas fronteiras da Palestina ocupada, e o Estado de Israel segue negando o direito de retorno. (Da Redação, com agências)
Da prisão israelense de Hadarim – onde cumpre cinco penas de prisão perpétua – o líder palestino Marwan Barghouti pediu ontem que "milhões" saiam às ruas em setembro, em apoio ao pedido de independência palestina, que deve acontecer em setembro, durante a Assembleia Geral da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU).
Em carta enviada à imprensa, ele incentiva os palestinos nos territórios ocupados por Israel e em outros países a "marchar pacificamente" durante a semana de votação do pedido na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas.
O plano palestino de pedir que a ONU aceite a Palestina como membro da organização deu início a uma disputa diplomática com Israel, que o considera – apoiado por seu aliado norte-americano – um ato unilateral, contrário aos acordos de paz assinados.
Com a paralisação das negociações de paz desde 2008 e sem sinais de que serão retomadas em breve, os palestinos disseram que pedirão na ONU uma votação em favor de sua independência. A aprovação na Assembleia Geral seria simbólica e teria pouco efeito prático, mas os palestinos acreditam que o endosso internacional representaria uma forte pressão para que Israel saia dos territórios ocupados.
O líder Barghouti manteve a influência que conquistou durante o movimento insurgente mesmo após ter sido preso. É frequentemente apontado em pesquisas como um dos favoritos à Presidência palestina.
No texto, ele diz que a ida à ONU é parte de uma nova estratégia palestina que abrirá as portas para mais manifestações. A ideia é reproduzir o espírito das revoluções árabes e acirrar a pressão sobre Israel com o aval da ONU.
"Vencer a batalha de setembro, que é um passo importante de nossa luta, requer os maiores protestos pacíficos aqui e na diáspora, nos países árabes e muçulmanos e nas capitais internacionais", disse Barghouti.
Líder palestino
Barghouti, de 51 anos, talvez seja o mais conhecido líder palestino detido por Israel – e um dos cerca de 10 mil presos políticos o que conflito já fez. Ele cumpre cinco sentenças de prisão perpétua por sua participação em levantes armados na última década. Seu nome sempre é citado quando se discute o futuro político da presidência palestina.
A mulher de Barghouti, Fadwa, afirmou que o marido ditou a mensagem para seus advogados durante uma visita recente. Ainda não está claro como a convocação de Barghouti vai evoluir, já que as manifestações vão depender da organização de ativistas pró-palestinos.
Segundo especialistas, Barghouti vem tendo sua trajetória política comparada a de Nelson Mandela – ativista e ex-presidente da África do Sul. A comparação é surgiu principalmente a partir das declarações do líder baseadas na chamada “resistência pacífica”, como pregava o militante africano. E hoje, mesmo preso, é uma das figuras mais populares da Autoridade Palestina.
Barghouti nasceu em uma aldeia próxima de Ramallah, e se tornou membro do Fatah ainda com 15 anos. Com 18, foi preso pela primeira vez por ter envolvimento com grupos militantes palestinos. Em 1987, atuou como um dos principais líderes da Primeira Intifada, levando os palestinos a protestarem em um levante contra Israel. Em 1996, Barghouti foi eleito para o Conselho Legislativo da Palestina, quando começou sua defesa ativa por um Estado Palestino independente.
Durante a Segunda Intifada, sua popularidade cresceu ainda mais e o líder passou a ser visto como uma das principais forças de combate contra as Forças de Defesa Israelenses. Ao mesmo tempo em que via sua popularidade junto às massas aumentar, o líder palestino exortava ações combativas contra Israel. Em 2001, ele conseguiu se livrar da primeira tentativa de prisão.
Só em abril de 2002, Barghouti foi preso, sob a acusação de assassinato e tentativa de homicídios decorrentes dos movimentos de insurgência popular dos quais participou. Desde que está preso, seus apoiadores – entre eles, autoridades políticas, militantes, membros do parlamento europeu – acreditam que Barghouti é uma espécie de Nelson Mandela palestino, uma vez que é apontado como o líder ideal para reanimar um movimento à deriva e dividido nacionalmente.
Estado palestino
No Brasil, a campanha “Pela Criação do Estado da Palestina Já” está em desenvolvimento e a manifestação é respaldada por cerca de três dezenas de organizações políticas e sociais. A Palestina já é reconhecida política e moralmente por mais de cem países.
A Palestina também foi admitida nas organizações da ONU, com exceção da Organização das Nações Unidas para a Educação, a Ciência e a Cultura (Unesco) e da Organização Mundial de Saúde (OMS). E o presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, em pronunciamento feito em maio deste ano, admitiu a criação do Estado palestino com as fronteiras de 1967.
O ministro da Defesa de Israel, Ehud Barak, comparou a eventual decisão da ONU em favor dos palestinos a um “tsunami”. O novo embaixador de Israel na ONU, Ron Prosor, informou à imprensa israelense que o reconhecimento da Palestina por parte da ONU “levaria à violência e à guerra”.
Em 1947, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) criou o Plano de Partilha da Palestina, que resultou na criação do Estado de Israel. Essa iniciativa abriu caminho para uma tragédia cotidiana para o povo palestino. Mais de 500 vilas e comunidades palestinas foram destruídas. Milhares foram presos, torturados e assassinados.
Palestinos foram expulsos de suas casas e de centenas de cidades. Cerca de 4,5 milhões de refugiados palestinos vivem hoje pelo mundo, sendo que a maioria destes se encontra nas fronteiras da Palestina ocupada, e o Estado de Israel segue negando o direito de retorno. (Da Redação, com agências)
segunda-feira, 11 de julho de 2011
União Africana pede entrada da Palestina nas Nações Unidas como Estado independente
Dakar, Senegal, 8 Julho 2011 (PANA) – A União Africana (UA) instou os seus representantes no Conselho de Segurança das Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) a apoiar os esforços da Palestina para a sua adesão a esta organização mundial como Estado-membro de pleno direito.
De acordo com as decisões da recém-terminada 17ª cimeira da UA em Malabo, na Guiné Equatorial, os países-membros desta organização continental, que ainda o não tenham feito, são chamados a reconhecer imediatamente o Estado da Palestina com Jerusalém Oriental como sua capital.
Este reconhecimento e o estatuto de membro pleno das Nações Unidas para o Estado da Palestina devem basear-se nas fronteiras de 4 de junho de 1967 que consagram Al-Quds Al-Sharif (Jerusalém) como a capital deste território do Médio Oriente, refere a documentação final da conferência de Malabo.
Para o efeito, a União Africana propõe ao Conselho de Segurança da ONU a convocação de uma "sessão de emergência" para analisar o estatuto do Estado Palestino com vista à sua adoção durante a próxima sessão ordinária da Assembleia Geral da ONU a decorrer, a partir de Setembro deste ano, na sua sede em Nova Iorque (Estados Unidos).
Pede ainda a retomada das negociações de paz entre a Palestina e Israel e reafirma o seu apoio a uma solução pacífica do conflito árabe-israelita “com base nos princípios do Direito Internacional e nas resoluções pertinentes da ONU, com ênfase na criação de um Estado palestino independente”.
A UA denuncia as “práticas desumanas israelitas contra prisioneiros e detidos palestinos” e apela ao Governo de Israel para cessar a sua “política de ocupação e agressão” em todo o território palestino.
Reitera a sua solidariedade para com o povo da Palestina e saúda o acordo de paz e reconciliação assinado entre os movimentos palestinos rivais do Hamas e do Fatah, a 4 de maio deste ano, na capital egípcia, Cairo, elogiando por isso o Egito por ter facilitado a assinatura deste documento.
O Egito é igualmente enaltecido pela abertura do posto fronteiriço de Rafah que pôs fiz a quatro anos de bloqueio contra a Faixa de Gaza.
De acordo com as decisões da recém-terminada 17ª cimeira da UA em Malabo, na Guiné Equatorial, os países-membros desta organização continental, que ainda o não tenham feito, são chamados a reconhecer imediatamente o Estado da Palestina com Jerusalém Oriental como sua capital.
Este reconhecimento e o estatuto de membro pleno das Nações Unidas para o Estado da Palestina devem basear-se nas fronteiras de 4 de junho de 1967 que consagram Al-Quds Al-Sharif (Jerusalém) como a capital deste território do Médio Oriente, refere a documentação final da conferência de Malabo.
Para o efeito, a União Africana propõe ao Conselho de Segurança da ONU a convocação de uma "sessão de emergência" para analisar o estatuto do Estado Palestino com vista à sua adoção durante a próxima sessão ordinária da Assembleia Geral da ONU a decorrer, a partir de Setembro deste ano, na sua sede em Nova Iorque (Estados Unidos).
Pede ainda a retomada das negociações de paz entre a Palestina e Israel e reafirma o seu apoio a uma solução pacífica do conflito árabe-israelita “com base nos princípios do Direito Internacional e nas resoluções pertinentes da ONU, com ênfase na criação de um Estado palestino independente”.
A UA denuncia as “práticas desumanas israelitas contra prisioneiros e detidos palestinos” e apela ao Governo de Israel para cessar a sua “política de ocupação e agressão” em todo o território palestino.
Reitera a sua solidariedade para com o povo da Palestina e saúda o acordo de paz e reconciliação assinado entre os movimentos palestinos rivais do Hamas e do Fatah, a 4 de maio deste ano, na capital egípcia, Cairo, elogiando por isso o Egito por ter facilitado a assinatura deste documento.
O Egito é igualmente enaltecido pela abertura do posto fronteiriço de Rafah que pôs fiz a quatro anos de bloqueio contra a Faixa de Gaza.
segunda-feira, 4 de julho de 2011
THE COMING ISRAELI TSUNAMI?
Commentary No. 307, June 15, 2011 (USA)
Immanuel Wallerstein
The Palestinians are pursuing their project of seeking a formal recognition of their statehood by the United Nations when the General Assembly convenes in the fall. They intend to request a statement that the state exists within the boundary lines as they existed in 1967 before the Israeli-Palestinian war. It is almost certain that the vote will be favorable. The only question at the moment is how favorable.
The Israeli political leadership is well aware of this. There are three different responses that are being discussed by them. The dominant position seems to be that of Prime Minister Netanyahu. He proposes ignoring such a resolution totally and simply continuing to pursue the Israeli government’s present policies. Netanyahu believes that, for a very long time, there have been resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly that have been unfavorable to Israel, all of which Israel has successfully ignored. Why should this one be any different?
There are a few politicians on the far right (yes, there is an even further right position than that of Netanyahu) who say that, in reprisal, Israel should formally annex all of the presently occupied Palestinian territories and end all talk of any negotiations with the Palestinians. Some of them also want to force an exodus of non-Jewish populations from this expanded Israeli state.
Former Prime Minister (and present Defense Minister) Ehud Barak, whose political base is now almost non-existent, is warning Netanyahu that he is being unrealistic. Barak says that the resolution will be a tsunami for Israel, and that therefore Netanyahu would be wisest somehow to make a deal with the Palestinians now, before the resolution passes.
Is Barak right? Will this be a tsunami for Israel? There is a good chance that he is. There is however virtually no chance that Netanyahu will heed Barak’s advice and try seriously to make a deal with the Palestinians before then.
Consider what is likely to happen in the General Assembly itself. We know that most (maybe all) countries in Latin America and a very large percentage of countries in Africa and Asia will vote for the resolution. We know that the United States will vote against it and try to persuade others to vote against it. The uncertain votes are those of Europe. If the Palestinians can get a significant number of European votes, their political position will be much reinforced.
So, will the Europeans vote for the resolution? That depends in part on what happens throughout the Arab world in the next two months. The French have already hinted openly that, unless they see significant progress in Israel-Palestinian negotiations (which are not even occurring at the moment), they will support such a resolution. If they do, it almost certain that southern European governments will join them. So may the Nordic countries. It is a more open question whether Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands are ready to join them. If these countries do decide to go with the resolution, this may resolve the hesitations of various east European countries. In this case, the resolution would obtain the vast majority of Europe’s votes.
We need to look therefore at what is going on in the Arab world. The second Arab revolt is still in full swing. It would be rash to predict exactly which regimes will fall and which will hold tight in the coming two months. What does seem clear is that the Palestinians are on the verge of launching a third intifada. The Palestinians, even the most conservative among them, seem to have given up hope that there can be any negotiated arrangement with Israel. This is the clear message of the agreement between Fatah and Hamas. And given that the Arab populations of virtually every Arab state are in direct political revolt against their regimes, how could the Palestinians remain relatively quiet? They will not remain quiet.
And if they do not remain quiet, what will other Arab regimes do? All of them are having a difficult enough time, to say the least, handling the uprisings in their own countries. Actively supporting a third intifada would be the easiest position to take as part of the effort they are making to regain control of their own country. Which regime would dare not support the third intifada? Egypt has already moved clearly in that direction. And King Abdullah of Jordan has hinted that he too would do so.
So imagine the sequence: a third intifada, followed by active Arab support for a third intifada, followed by Israeli intransigence. What will the Europeans then do? It is hard to see them refusing to vote for the resolution. We could easily arrive at a vote with only Israel, the United States, and a very few tiny countries voting against, and perhaps a few abstentions.
This sounds like a possible tsunami to me. Israel’s major fear for the past few years has been “delegitimization.” Would not such a vote precisely encrust the process of delegitimization? And would not the isolation of the United States in this vote further weaken its position in the Arab world as a whole? What then will the United States do?
Immanuel Wallerstein
The Palestinians are pursuing their project of seeking a formal recognition of their statehood by the United Nations when the General Assembly convenes in the fall. They intend to request a statement that the state exists within the boundary lines as they existed in 1967 before the Israeli-Palestinian war. It is almost certain that the vote will be favorable. The only question at the moment is how favorable.
The Israeli political leadership is well aware of this. There are three different responses that are being discussed by them. The dominant position seems to be that of Prime Minister Netanyahu. He proposes ignoring such a resolution totally and simply continuing to pursue the Israeli government’s present policies. Netanyahu believes that, for a very long time, there have been resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly that have been unfavorable to Israel, all of which Israel has successfully ignored. Why should this one be any different?
There are a few politicians on the far right (yes, there is an even further right position than that of Netanyahu) who say that, in reprisal, Israel should formally annex all of the presently occupied Palestinian territories and end all talk of any negotiations with the Palestinians. Some of them also want to force an exodus of non-Jewish populations from this expanded Israeli state.
Former Prime Minister (and present Defense Minister) Ehud Barak, whose political base is now almost non-existent, is warning Netanyahu that he is being unrealistic. Barak says that the resolution will be a tsunami for Israel, and that therefore Netanyahu would be wisest somehow to make a deal with the Palestinians now, before the resolution passes.
Is Barak right? Will this be a tsunami for Israel? There is a good chance that he is. There is however virtually no chance that Netanyahu will heed Barak’s advice and try seriously to make a deal with the Palestinians before then.
Consider what is likely to happen in the General Assembly itself. We know that most (maybe all) countries in Latin America and a very large percentage of countries in Africa and Asia will vote for the resolution. We know that the United States will vote against it and try to persuade others to vote against it. The uncertain votes are those of Europe. If the Palestinians can get a significant number of European votes, their political position will be much reinforced.
So, will the Europeans vote for the resolution? That depends in part on what happens throughout the Arab world in the next two months. The French have already hinted openly that, unless they see significant progress in Israel-Palestinian negotiations (which are not even occurring at the moment), they will support such a resolution. If they do, it almost certain that southern European governments will join them. So may the Nordic countries. It is a more open question whether Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands are ready to join them. If these countries do decide to go with the resolution, this may resolve the hesitations of various east European countries. In this case, the resolution would obtain the vast majority of Europe’s votes.
We need to look therefore at what is going on in the Arab world. The second Arab revolt is still in full swing. It would be rash to predict exactly which regimes will fall and which will hold tight in the coming two months. What does seem clear is that the Palestinians are on the verge of launching a third intifada. The Palestinians, even the most conservative among them, seem to have given up hope that there can be any negotiated arrangement with Israel. This is the clear message of the agreement between Fatah and Hamas. And given that the Arab populations of virtually every Arab state are in direct political revolt against their regimes, how could the Palestinians remain relatively quiet? They will not remain quiet.
And if they do not remain quiet, what will other Arab regimes do? All of them are having a difficult enough time, to say the least, handling the uprisings in their own countries. Actively supporting a third intifada would be the easiest position to take as part of the effort they are making to regain control of their own country. Which regime would dare not support the third intifada? Egypt has already moved clearly in that direction. And King Abdullah of Jordan has hinted that he too would do so.
So imagine the sequence: a third intifada, followed by active Arab support for a third intifada, followed by Israeli intransigence. What will the Europeans then do? It is hard to see them refusing to vote for the resolution. We could easily arrive at a vote with only Israel, the United States, and a very few tiny countries voting against, and perhaps a few abstentions.
This sounds like a possible tsunami to me. Israel’s major fear for the past few years has been “delegitimization.” Would not such a vote precisely encrust the process of delegitimization? And would not the isolation of the United States in this vote further weaken its position in the Arab world as a whole? What then will the United States do?
quarta-feira, 22 de junho de 2011
Brasil: Lançada em São Paulo campanha pelo Estado da Palestina já
21 Junho 2011, Vermelho (Brasil)
Entidades do movimento social brasileiro, associações da comunidade árabe e palestina no Brasil e partidos de esquerda realizaram na noite da última segunda-feira (20) em São Paulo, na sede nacional do PCdoB, uma reunião em que lançaram a campanha “Pela Criação do Estado da Palestina Já!” Como convidado de honra participou do encontro o embaixador da Autoridade Nacional Palestina no Brasil, Ibrahim al-Zeben.
As organizações presentes eram PCdoB, PT, MST, CUT, CTB, UJS, Cebrapaz, Comissão Pastoral da Terra, Fearab, Fepal, Portal Arabesq, Portal Vermelho, Sociedade Palestina de São Paulo, Sociedade Palestina de Uruguaiana, Comunidade Maronita Libanesa El Marada e Partido Comunista Libanês. O deputado estadual Adriano Diogo (PT-SP) também compareceu à sede do PCdoB para levar apoio à causa palestina.
As entidades organizarão no mês de novembro uma convenção nacional de solidariedade com a Palestina, cuja preparação envolverá uma série de ações, entre elas um seminário de aprofundamento e estudo no mês de julho.
Para o embaixador Ibrahim al-Zeben, “as organizações do movimento social brasileiro e os partidos presentes mais uma vez abrem os olhos da militância para os problemas da Palestina, mais uma vez os nossos amigos do Brasil dão a cara e brindam suas mãos e seu coração em apoio à Palestina”.
Ele explicou porque agora a questão palestina emerge com tanta força, a ponto de ser submetida às Nações Unidas: “Estamos melhor que antes, com a perspectiva de restaurar a unidade nacional e transformar a OLP”. Segundo sua análise, a “Primavera Árabe” abriu as portas e ajudou o Fatah e o Hamas a se darem conta da situação e reconstruíssem a unidade nacional. O representante da ANP no Brasil lembrou Yasser Arafat que dizia que o povo é mais avançado que as lideranças. “As massas disseram ‘chega´ de divisão e pediram a unidade nacional para já”, pontuou AL-Zeben, que defendeu também a necessidade de criar em breve “um governo representativo de todos os palestinos”.
O embaixador não poupou críticas ao governo israelense, “cada vez mais intransigente e negativo em relação aos direitos dos palestinos”. Ele fez o balanço de 15 anos de negociações, chegando à conclusão de que “os palestinos tudo fizeram, mas houve uma constante negativa por parte do governo de Israel”. O embaixador destacou ainda o papel positivo da diplomacia brasileira.
Ibrahim al-Zeben anunciou que a ANP vai tomar posições importantes nas próximas semanas: “Vamos solicitar assento como membro pleno da ONU. A solicitação vai ser feita pela Liga Árabe”. Sabendo que será uma luta difícil e complexa para fazer valer a decisão palestina nas instâncias da ONU, AL-Zeben disse que mais do que nunca seu povo necessitará do apoio da comunidade internacional. “Acreditamos no apoio do Brasil e consideramos que este precisa do apoio do movimento popular”.
A reunião foi unânime no apoio à reivindicação de criar o Estado da Palestina já.
(Da redação)
Entidades do movimento social brasileiro, associações da comunidade árabe e palestina no Brasil e partidos de esquerda realizaram na noite da última segunda-feira (20) em São Paulo, na sede nacional do PCdoB, uma reunião em que lançaram a campanha “Pela Criação do Estado da Palestina Já!” Como convidado de honra participou do encontro o embaixador da Autoridade Nacional Palestina no Brasil, Ibrahim al-Zeben.
As organizações presentes eram PCdoB, PT, MST, CUT, CTB, UJS, Cebrapaz, Comissão Pastoral da Terra, Fearab, Fepal, Portal Arabesq, Portal Vermelho, Sociedade Palestina de São Paulo, Sociedade Palestina de Uruguaiana, Comunidade Maronita Libanesa El Marada e Partido Comunista Libanês. O deputado estadual Adriano Diogo (PT-SP) também compareceu à sede do PCdoB para levar apoio à causa palestina.
As entidades organizarão no mês de novembro uma convenção nacional de solidariedade com a Palestina, cuja preparação envolverá uma série de ações, entre elas um seminário de aprofundamento e estudo no mês de julho.
Para o embaixador Ibrahim al-Zeben, “as organizações do movimento social brasileiro e os partidos presentes mais uma vez abrem os olhos da militância para os problemas da Palestina, mais uma vez os nossos amigos do Brasil dão a cara e brindam suas mãos e seu coração em apoio à Palestina”.
Ele explicou porque agora a questão palestina emerge com tanta força, a ponto de ser submetida às Nações Unidas: “Estamos melhor que antes, com a perspectiva de restaurar a unidade nacional e transformar a OLP”. Segundo sua análise, a “Primavera Árabe” abriu as portas e ajudou o Fatah e o Hamas a se darem conta da situação e reconstruíssem a unidade nacional. O representante da ANP no Brasil lembrou Yasser Arafat que dizia que o povo é mais avançado que as lideranças. “As massas disseram ‘chega´ de divisão e pediram a unidade nacional para já”, pontuou AL-Zeben, que defendeu também a necessidade de criar em breve “um governo representativo de todos os palestinos”.
O embaixador não poupou críticas ao governo israelense, “cada vez mais intransigente e negativo em relação aos direitos dos palestinos”. Ele fez o balanço de 15 anos de negociações, chegando à conclusão de que “os palestinos tudo fizeram, mas houve uma constante negativa por parte do governo de Israel”. O embaixador destacou ainda o papel positivo da diplomacia brasileira.
Ibrahim al-Zeben anunciou que a ANP vai tomar posições importantes nas próximas semanas: “Vamos solicitar assento como membro pleno da ONU. A solicitação vai ser feita pela Liga Árabe”. Sabendo que será uma luta difícil e complexa para fazer valer a decisão palestina nas instâncias da ONU, AL-Zeben disse que mais do que nunca seu povo necessitará do apoio da comunidade internacional. “Acreditamos no apoio do Brasil e consideramos que este precisa do apoio do movimento popular”.
A reunião foi unânime no apoio à reivindicação de criar o Estado da Palestina já.
(Da redação)
quarta-feira, 15 de junho de 2011
The case for UN recognition of Palestine
13 June 2011, The Electronic Intifada http://electronicintifada.net (USA)
Victor Kattan*
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to divide Palestinians, who must remain united to secure support before the UN vote on a Palestinian state, and to protect Palestinian refugees’ right of return.
Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and President of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, affirmed in The New York Times on 17 May 2011 that “this September, at the United Nations General Assembly, we will request international recognition of the State of Palestine on the 1967 border and that our state be admitted as a full member of the United Nations” (“The Long Overdue Palestinian State,” 16 May 2011).
Although this announcement has provoked a storm of indignation amongst certain constituencies in the United States, it will not come as a complete surprise to those who have been following developments closely. In the past six months several Latin American countries have recognized the state of Palestine, bringing the total number of countries to have done so since 1988 to more than 100. In addition, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have upgraded the Palestine General Delegations in their capitals to diplomatic missions and embassies — a status normally reserved for states.
From Abbas’s op-ed it would appear that there are two prongs to this strategy: international recognition of Palestine as a state, and membership of the United Nations.
International recognition
Although the Palestinian strategy has not been fully articulated, it appears that the PLO hopes to use the opening plenary of the UN General Assembly in September as a forum to call upon other states to recognize it. In other words, it will seek collective recognition.
According to Riyad al-Maliki, the PA foreign minister, some 150 countries have said that they will recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders in September (“PA: 150 states to recognize Palestine by Sept,” 3 March 2011). If this number is achieved it could be significant, especially if it includes recognition from some of the countries in the European Union. This is because if recognition of a Palestinian state is viewed as constitutive (the argument that statehood is a matter of recognition only) then the number and quality of states that recognize Palestine is important.
If, however, recognition of a Palestinian state is viewed as declaratory (the argument that recognition alone cannot confer statehood but must be accompanied by other factors, independence being particularly important) then there is of course a problem if Israel retains control over the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
UN membership
Phase II of the 2003 Roadmap prepared by the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN) and endorsed by the UN Security Council calls for “creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement.” As part of Phase II (June-December 2003), Quartet members were supposed to “promote international recognition of a Palestinian state, including possible UN membership” (“The Performance-Based Roadmap Towards a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestine Conflict).
Thus, the Quartet envisaged that a Palestinian state could be established prior to the conclusion of final status negotiations with Israel. In other words, it was accepted that the PLO need not wait until Israel had agreed to completely withdraw from the territory before asserting its claim to statehood with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty by seeking recognition and UN membership.
Abbas also announced in his op-ed that the PLO also intends to seek UN membership in September. According to Article 4 (2) of the UN Charter, admission to membership in the UN is to be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon receiving a recommendation from the Security Council. It is possible that American opposition at the Security Council may not block such a recommendation.
In his address at the State Department on 19 May 2011, US President Barack Obama declared, “Symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September won’t create an independent state” (“Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa19 May 2011). It is worth noting that Obama did not flatly oppose such a Palestinian move and his statement is open to different interpretations, although one must assume that the US would veto Palestinian membership given Washington’s appalling track record of vetoing UN resolutions on the Palestine question.
Nevertheless, US opposition to Palestine’s membership of the UN would not necessarily affect Palestine’s statehood if 150 states do recognize Palestine at the UN in September and assuming that recognition is constitutive. Statehood and membership in international organizations are entirely separate matters. For instance, Taiwan is not a member of the UN but it is a state. The Vatican is considered a state but it is not a member of the UN. Kosovo is considered a state by major powers, including the US and the EU, but it is not a member of the UN. Switzerland only joined the UN in 2002 but it was a state long before then. During the Cold War, many states had their application for membership at the UN vetoed (such as Ireland, Jordan, and some Soviet republics) but this did not mean that they were not states.
Although some scholars have suggested that the PLO and its allies could still turn to the General Assembly and ask it to consider membership under the Uniting for Peace resolution that can be invoked when the Security Council is deadlocked, this is a risky strategy.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1950 Admissions case made it clear that the UN Charter does not place the Security Council in a subordinate position to the General Assembly in matters of UN membership (International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion: Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 3 March 1950). In the words of the court, “To hold that the General Assembly has power to admit a State to membership in the absence of recommendation of the Security Council would be to deprive the Security Council of an important power which has been entrusted to it by the UN Charter.”
Accordingly, the ICJ was of the opinion that “The admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Charter, cannot be effected by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission, by reason of the candidate failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so to recommend.”
Consequently, it is likely that should the US veto Palestine’s application for membership, then Palestine will not become a UN member. Instead its position would be similar to that of Kosovo (whose membership is being blocked by Russia) and Taiwan (whose membership is being blocked by China).
The potential risks and benefits of statehood
Critics have attacked the Palestinian strategy of seeking membership of the UN as a state in September as being futile and a waste of time that will do nothing to change things on the ground.
“The only thing that could be gained from UN recognition,” argues Ali Abunimah, “is for Abbas and his entourage to obtain international recognition for themselves as leaders of an imaginary ‘state’ while nothing changes on the ground for Palestinians.”
In 2009, I also argued that a Palestinian state that is recognized “with its territory partitioned, and subdivided into cantons, surrounded by walls, fences, ditches, watchtowers, and barbed wire, would scarcely be a state worthy of the name” (“UDI won’t mean Palestinian statehood,” Guardian, 19 Novermber 2009).
However, although there are risks involved, and although the PLO’s current leadership lacks credibility given the grievous mistakes of the past two decades, the advantages of this Palestinian strategy could outweigh the disadvantages. Nor, as will be discussed below, would statehood necessarily bring an end of the dream some hold of a democratic state for all its citizens.
Assuming that 150 states, including those from the EU, recognize Palestine as a state, one of the consequences is that this would formally level the playing field between Israel and Palestine on the diplomatic level. In other words, it would become a relationship between states rather than between a state and a non-state actor. Palestine would be able to formally join the international community and to insist upon a relationship based on sovereign equality. Moreover, Palestine’s status will be formally recognized without Palestine having to make any concessions on settlements, the right of return, or Jerusalem, etc. Accordingly, in any future negotiations on these issues Palestine can negotiate with Israel as a state, i.e. as an equal rather than as an occupied people.
One of the consequences of this “formal equality” is that new avenues will become available to Palestine to pursue legal remedies against Israel in various international forums. As a state, Palestine will be able to ratify international treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where an application on the status of Palestine, is currently pending. Even if the US manages to block membership of a Palestinian state, recognition by a large number of states at the UN General Assembly would greatly strengthen Palestine’s claim to statehood and may have a favorable impact on the declaration lodged at the ICC. Should the ICC accept that Palestine is a state for the purposes of its statute, it may commence investigations into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity from any time since July 2002 (the date the ICC Statute entered into force). For the first time in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israelis accused of major human rights violations could be held to account for their crimes.
The discourse might also change. Palestine could insist that the settlements and the continued occupation are a breach of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and demand that Israel withdraws from the territory. For instance, Palestine could state that Israel is occupying a foreign state as Iraq did in Kuwait in 1990 and as South Africa did in Namibia for more than 40 years, and demand its immediate withdrawal. Should Israel desist and attack Palestinians on the scale say of its 2008-09 winter invasion of Gaza, then Palestine would be able to insist on its right of self-defense under Article 51 UN Charter (“Speech by PM Netanyahu to a Joint Meeting of the US Congress,” 24 May 2011).
Should Israel continue to reject dismantling the settlements and withdrawing from the territory of Palestine, then the State of Palestine can as an aspect of its sovereignty demand that those persons either accept to become Palestinian citizens and abide by the rule of law in Palestine or leave. Should Israel still refuse to withdraw from the territory or dismantle the settlements then Palestine would be able to ask the UN Security Council to take measure to force Israel’s departure from the territory.
If the Security Council does not do so, then Palestine could seek support elsewhere and ask for a further advisory opinion from the ICJ asking what third states would be obliged to do in the event that Israel fails to bring to an end to the occupation that threatens international peace and security.
If Palestine did become a state, and was recognized as such by other states, this would strengthen its argument that it has sovereign immunity, which could protect it from politically inspired lawsuits in the US for “terrorist offenses” under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Antiterrorism Act, which has caused Palestinian officials a headache in recent years. Palestinian officials, in turn, would be accorded diplomatic immunity, and could demand consular protection for their own nationals when they find themselves in trouble in foreign countries. This would include demanding a legal right to offer consular assistance to Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails as well as jails in other countries.
Palestine would also be in a position to join a plethora of international organizations, in addition to the UN, such as the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which would give it extra rights that can only be granted to states. It would be in a better position to boost trade with other countries by for instance concluding a full Association Agreement with the European Union and similar organizations, which might allow it to improve the economic prosperity of its citizens.
If, in addition, Palestine became a member of the UN, it would be able to draft, propose, and table its own resolutions at the UN and vote on them and others. Palestine could also conceivably even be elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council one day.
Moreover, Palestine’s security forces could insist on no longer being described as “terrorists,” but as the forces of a state whose troops are entitled to prisoner of war status. This would mean that if they are captured in an armed conflict with Israeli soldiers they should not be tried for murder in an Israeli court or any other tribunal if they have lawfully killed members of Israel’s armed forces (as opposed to being involved in deliberate armed attacks against civilians.) Regarding the fear that the PLO’s statehood strategy might preclude the wishes of those Palestinians who strive for a bi-national state or a one-state solution to the conflict, it should be remembered that a state can always merge with another state if they are both interested in such a union (e.g., the union of Egypt and Syria when they established the United Arab Republic in 1958).
Moreover, in its constitution, Palestine could make it clear that recognition of a Palestinian state would be without prejudice to the right of Palestinian refugees to return and compensation or to any other political solution that might arise in the future. In other words it would not necessarily spell the end of a bi-national or one-state solution if such a solution is desired by a majority of Palestinians and Israelis one day. Such a provision for instance exists in the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern Ireland, allowing for the possibility for reunification if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland concurrently vote in favour of reunification. The Constitution of Ireland was amended to reflect this and a similar provision might be considered for a Palestinian constitution.
Staying the course
Of course, much could change before September. One cannot predict what Israel might do, although it certainly senses that the winds of change are blowing through the region. It is not entirely inconceivable that it may respond with a “dramatic” gesture such as agreeing to withdraw from most of the West Bank and even dismantling one or two outposts in order to portray Israel as being “moderate.” This much can be gleaned from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent speech to the US Congress.
Alternatively, Israel could provoke a border conflict with Hamas or Hizballah in order to divide the Palestinians. This much too can be gleaned from Netanyahu’s speech to Congress.
The PLO has undoubtedly lost legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of many Palestinians in Palestine and in the Diaspora. As “The Palestine Papers” leaked to Al Jazeera and the Guardian clearly showed, the Palestinian leadership has been willing to make far too many concessions on Palestinian rights. This might explain why the PLO is taking a tougher stance on the statehood question. It finally realized that it had exhausted the option of negotiations. Israel’s minimum conditions for accepting a Palestinian state (no right of return, a demilitarized state, annexation of settlement blocs, no sovereignty over Jerusalem, no sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, etc.) are far less that what any Palestinian leader can accept.
Netanyahu wants to divide the Palestinians. Before Congress he pointedly called upon Abbas to tear up his unity agreement with Hamas. Netanyahu knows full well that such an action would divide Palestinian society, possibly provoking civil war. Abbas must not fall for any attempts to cajole him away from his current strategy. If he is serious about seeking statehood, then Palestinians must remain steadfast and united and the PLO must secure as much support as it can before the UN vote. Indeed, it should seek support from more than 150 states. For the more states that recognize Palestine as a state, the greater its case for statehood.
*Victor Kattan is the author of From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949 (London: Pluto Books, 2009) and The Palestine Question in International Law (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008). Victor was a Teaching Fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London from 2008-2011 where he is presently completing his PhD. Previously Victor worked for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2006-2008), Arab Media Watch (2004-2006), and the BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights as a UNDP TOKTEN consultant (2003-2004).
A version of this essay was originally published by Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian policy network.
Victor Kattan*
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to divide Palestinians, who must remain united to secure support before the UN vote on a Palestinian state, and to protect Palestinian refugees’ right of return.
Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and President of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, affirmed in The New York Times on 17 May 2011 that “this September, at the United Nations General Assembly, we will request international recognition of the State of Palestine on the 1967 border and that our state be admitted as a full member of the United Nations” (“The Long Overdue Palestinian State,” 16 May 2011).
Although this announcement has provoked a storm of indignation amongst certain constituencies in the United States, it will not come as a complete surprise to those who have been following developments closely. In the past six months several Latin American countries have recognized the state of Palestine, bringing the total number of countries to have done so since 1988 to more than 100. In addition, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have upgraded the Palestine General Delegations in their capitals to diplomatic missions and embassies — a status normally reserved for states.
From Abbas’s op-ed it would appear that there are two prongs to this strategy: international recognition of Palestine as a state, and membership of the United Nations.
International recognition
Although the Palestinian strategy has not been fully articulated, it appears that the PLO hopes to use the opening plenary of the UN General Assembly in September as a forum to call upon other states to recognize it. In other words, it will seek collective recognition.
According to Riyad al-Maliki, the PA foreign minister, some 150 countries have said that they will recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders in September (“PA: 150 states to recognize Palestine by Sept,” 3 March 2011). If this number is achieved it could be significant, especially if it includes recognition from some of the countries in the European Union. This is because if recognition of a Palestinian state is viewed as constitutive (the argument that statehood is a matter of recognition only) then the number and quality of states that recognize Palestine is important.
If, however, recognition of a Palestinian state is viewed as declaratory (the argument that recognition alone cannot confer statehood but must be accompanied by other factors, independence being particularly important) then there is of course a problem if Israel retains control over the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
UN membership
Phase II of the 2003 Roadmap prepared by the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN) and endorsed by the UN Security Council calls for “creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement.” As part of Phase II (June-December 2003), Quartet members were supposed to “promote international recognition of a Palestinian state, including possible UN membership” (“The Performance-Based Roadmap Towards a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestine Conflict).
Thus, the Quartet envisaged that a Palestinian state could be established prior to the conclusion of final status negotiations with Israel. In other words, it was accepted that the PLO need not wait until Israel had agreed to completely withdraw from the territory before asserting its claim to statehood with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty by seeking recognition and UN membership.
Abbas also announced in his op-ed that the PLO also intends to seek UN membership in September. According to Article 4 (2) of the UN Charter, admission to membership in the UN is to be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon receiving a recommendation from the Security Council. It is possible that American opposition at the Security Council may not block such a recommendation.
In his address at the State Department on 19 May 2011, US President Barack Obama declared, “Symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September won’t create an independent state” (“Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa19 May 2011). It is worth noting that Obama did not flatly oppose such a Palestinian move and his statement is open to different interpretations, although one must assume that the US would veto Palestinian membership given Washington’s appalling track record of vetoing UN resolutions on the Palestine question.
Nevertheless, US opposition to Palestine’s membership of the UN would not necessarily affect Palestine’s statehood if 150 states do recognize Palestine at the UN in September and assuming that recognition is constitutive. Statehood and membership in international organizations are entirely separate matters. For instance, Taiwan is not a member of the UN but it is a state. The Vatican is considered a state but it is not a member of the UN. Kosovo is considered a state by major powers, including the US and the EU, but it is not a member of the UN. Switzerland only joined the UN in 2002 but it was a state long before then. During the Cold War, many states had their application for membership at the UN vetoed (such as Ireland, Jordan, and some Soviet republics) but this did not mean that they were not states.
Although some scholars have suggested that the PLO and its allies could still turn to the General Assembly and ask it to consider membership under the Uniting for Peace resolution that can be invoked when the Security Council is deadlocked, this is a risky strategy.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1950 Admissions case made it clear that the UN Charter does not place the Security Council in a subordinate position to the General Assembly in matters of UN membership (International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion: Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 3 March 1950). In the words of the court, “To hold that the General Assembly has power to admit a State to membership in the absence of recommendation of the Security Council would be to deprive the Security Council of an important power which has been entrusted to it by the UN Charter.”
Accordingly, the ICJ was of the opinion that “The admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Charter, cannot be effected by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission, by reason of the candidate failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so to recommend.”
Consequently, it is likely that should the US veto Palestine’s application for membership, then Palestine will not become a UN member. Instead its position would be similar to that of Kosovo (whose membership is being blocked by Russia) and Taiwan (whose membership is being blocked by China).
The potential risks and benefits of statehood
Critics have attacked the Palestinian strategy of seeking membership of the UN as a state in September as being futile and a waste of time that will do nothing to change things on the ground.
“The only thing that could be gained from UN recognition,” argues Ali Abunimah, “is for Abbas and his entourage to obtain international recognition for themselves as leaders of an imaginary ‘state’ while nothing changes on the ground for Palestinians.”
In 2009, I also argued that a Palestinian state that is recognized “with its territory partitioned, and subdivided into cantons, surrounded by walls, fences, ditches, watchtowers, and barbed wire, would scarcely be a state worthy of the name” (“UDI won’t mean Palestinian statehood,” Guardian, 19 Novermber 2009).
However, although there are risks involved, and although the PLO’s current leadership lacks credibility given the grievous mistakes of the past two decades, the advantages of this Palestinian strategy could outweigh the disadvantages. Nor, as will be discussed below, would statehood necessarily bring an end of the dream some hold of a democratic state for all its citizens.
Assuming that 150 states, including those from the EU, recognize Palestine as a state, one of the consequences is that this would formally level the playing field between Israel and Palestine on the diplomatic level. In other words, it would become a relationship between states rather than between a state and a non-state actor. Palestine would be able to formally join the international community and to insist upon a relationship based on sovereign equality. Moreover, Palestine’s status will be formally recognized without Palestine having to make any concessions on settlements, the right of return, or Jerusalem, etc. Accordingly, in any future negotiations on these issues Palestine can negotiate with Israel as a state, i.e. as an equal rather than as an occupied people.
One of the consequences of this “formal equality” is that new avenues will become available to Palestine to pursue legal remedies against Israel in various international forums. As a state, Palestine will be able to ratify international treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where an application on the status of Palestine, is currently pending. Even if the US manages to block membership of a Palestinian state, recognition by a large number of states at the UN General Assembly would greatly strengthen Palestine’s claim to statehood and may have a favorable impact on the declaration lodged at the ICC. Should the ICC accept that Palestine is a state for the purposes of its statute, it may commence investigations into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity from any time since July 2002 (the date the ICC Statute entered into force). For the first time in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israelis accused of major human rights violations could be held to account for their crimes.
The discourse might also change. Palestine could insist that the settlements and the continued occupation are a breach of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and demand that Israel withdraws from the territory. For instance, Palestine could state that Israel is occupying a foreign state as Iraq did in Kuwait in 1990 and as South Africa did in Namibia for more than 40 years, and demand its immediate withdrawal. Should Israel desist and attack Palestinians on the scale say of its 2008-09 winter invasion of Gaza, then Palestine would be able to insist on its right of self-defense under Article 51 UN Charter (“Speech by PM Netanyahu to a Joint Meeting of the US Congress,” 24 May 2011).
Should Israel continue to reject dismantling the settlements and withdrawing from the territory of Palestine, then the State of Palestine can as an aspect of its sovereignty demand that those persons either accept to become Palestinian citizens and abide by the rule of law in Palestine or leave. Should Israel still refuse to withdraw from the territory or dismantle the settlements then Palestine would be able to ask the UN Security Council to take measure to force Israel’s departure from the territory.
If the Security Council does not do so, then Palestine could seek support elsewhere and ask for a further advisory opinion from the ICJ asking what third states would be obliged to do in the event that Israel fails to bring to an end to the occupation that threatens international peace and security.
If Palestine did become a state, and was recognized as such by other states, this would strengthen its argument that it has sovereign immunity, which could protect it from politically inspired lawsuits in the US for “terrorist offenses” under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Antiterrorism Act, which has caused Palestinian officials a headache in recent years. Palestinian officials, in turn, would be accorded diplomatic immunity, and could demand consular protection for their own nationals when they find themselves in trouble in foreign countries. This would include demanding a legal right to offer consular assistance to Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails as well as jails in other countries.
Palestine would also be in a position to join a plethora of international organizations, in addition to the UN, such as the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which would give it extra rights that can only be granted to states. It would be in a better position to boost trade with other countries by for instance concluding a full Association Agreement with the European Union and similar organizations, which might allow it to improve the economic prosperity of its citizens.
If, in addition, Palestine became a member of the UN, it would be able to draft, propose, and table its own resolutions at the UN and vote on them and others. Palestine could also conceivably even be elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council one day.
Moreover, Palestine’s security forces could insist on no longer being described as “terrorists,” but as the forces of a state whose troops are entitled to prisoner of war status. This would mean that if they are captured in an armed conflict with Israeli soldiers they should not be tried for murder in an Israeli court or any other tribunal if they have lawfully killed members of Israel’s armed forces (as opposed to being involved in deliberate armed attacks against civilians.) Regarding the fear that the PLO’s statehood strategy might preclude the wishes of those Palestinians who strive for a bi-national state or a one-state solution to the conflict, it should be remembered that a state can always merge with another state if they are both interested in such a union (e.g., the union of Egypt and Syria when they established the United Arab Republic in 1958).
Moreover, in its constitution, Palestine could make it clear that recognition of a Palestinian state would be without prejudice to the right of Palestinian refugees to return and compensation or to any other political solution that might arise in the future. In other words it would not necessarily spell the end of a bi-national or one-state solution if such a solution is desired by a majority of Palestinians and Israelis one day. Such a provision for instance exists in the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern Ireland, allowing for the possibility for reunification if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland concurrently vote in favour of reunification. The Constitution of Ireland was amended to reflect this and a similar provision might be considered for a Palestinian constitution.
Staying the course
Of course, much could change before September. One cannot predict what Israel might do, although it certainly senses that the winds of change are blowing through the region. It is not entirely inconceivable that it may respond with a “dramatic” gesture such as agreeing to withdraw from most of the West Bank and even dismantling one or two outposts in order to portray Israel as being “moderate.” This much can be gleaned from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent speech to the US Congress.
Alternatively, Israel could provoke a border conflict with Hamas or Hizballah in order to divide the Palestinians. This much too can be gleaned from Netanyahu’s speech to Congress.
The PLO has undoubtedly lost legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of many Palestinians in Palestine and in the Diaspora. As “The Palestine Papers” leaked to Al Jazeera and the Guardian clearly showed, the Palestinian leadership has been willing to make far too many concessions on Palestinian rights. This might explain why the PLO is taking a tougher stance on the statehood question. It finally realized that it had exhausted the option of negotiations. Israel’s minimum conditions for accepting a Palestinian state (no right of return, a demilitarized state, annexation of settlement blocs, no sovereignty over Jerusalem, no sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, etc.) are far less that what any Palestinian leader can accept.
Netanyahu wants to divide the Palestinians. Before Congress he pointedly called upon Abbas to tear up his unity agreement with Hamas. Netanyahu knows full well that such an action would divide Palestinian society, possibly provoking civil war. Abbas must not fall for any attempts to cajole him away from his current strategy. If he is serious about seeking statehood, then Palestinians must remain steadfast and united and the PLO must secure as much support as it can before the UN vote. Indeed, it should seek support from more than 150 states. For the more states that recognize Palestine as a state, the greater its case for statehood.
*Victor Kattan is the author of From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949 (London: Pluto Books, 2009) and The Palestine Question in International Law (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008). Victor was a Teaching Fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London from 2008-2011 where he is presently completing his PhD. Previously Victor worked for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2006-2008), Arab Media Watch (2004-2006), and the BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights as a UNDP TOKTEN consultant (2003-2004).
A version of this essay was originally published by Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian policy network.
The parameters of change in Egypt’s foreign policy
In place of the old policies which were designed to safeguard the regime's interests, new approaches to the Palestinian question and other regional issues are being drawn up that will reflect Egypt's new voice
13 Jun 2011, Al Ahram Online
Emad Gad
After the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and the formation of Essam Sharaf’s cabinet which brought in Nabil El-Arabi as foreign minister, there has been much talk about core changes in Egypt’s foreign policy. These analyses are based on statements by El-Arabi regarding Egypt’s readiness to restore relations with Iran, and readings of statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning about alterations in Egypt’s foreign policies, as well as signs of these modifications.
Meanwhile, several factors came together to form a picture that is being promoted as an example of the deep nature of these changes in Egyptian foreign policy, as if Egypt has joined the “opposing axis” or is on its way to join the ranks of “snubbed” countries or the camp hostile to the West, such as Iran. These factors include Egypt’s request to revise the price of natural gas exported to Israel, Cairo’s sponsorship of the reconciliation process between Fatah and Hamas and the decision to permanently open the Rafah border crossing starting on 28 May.
A closer look at these claims reveals that these are deliberate statements intended to group elements together to prove actual and expected changes in Egypt’s foreign policy. Let us first deconstruct these elements and discuss Egypt’s foreign policy during Mubarak’s era. Mubarak manipulated Egypt’s foreign policy in the last five years to create a succession scenario for his son Gamal. To this end, he used the results of the Palestinian 2006 parliamentary elections – which brought in Hamas as a majority – to send messages to the West, and the US in particular, asserting that any honest and transparent elections will bring Islamists into power. The people of Egypt are not “mature” enough to exercise democracy, he argued, and allowing political Islam to take over the helm would harm the interests of the West and dissolve the peace treaty with Israel.
Israel’s war against Lebanon also broke out in 2006, and private Egyptian newspapers distributed photos of Hassan Nasrallah, which gave Mubarak another card to play in the plot of succession by saying that Egyptian public opinion is fanatical and could usher in figures who oppose the West and Israel. Therefore, it would be best not to demand democracy or human rights in Egypt until the people become more seasoned.
After that, Mubarak arrived at a pact with the US whereby he was left to his own devices regarding domestic issues, since he knew his people best, particularly how to control them and safeguard US interests and the peace treaty with Israel. In return, Egypt would apply any regional policies dictated by Washington, which indirectly means Israel.
Once Mubarak was removed from power this pact collapsed, and Egyptian foreign policy was liberated from the limitations of the succession project and adopted the policies of a major regional power with a dignity and independence which commands respect and appreciation. Cairo began implementing foreign policies which serve Egypt’s interests, not the interests of the succession scenario and was no longer hostage to it. This is the actual change has that occurred in Egypt’s foreign policy, namely liberation from a pact to sell Egypt’s regional role to serve the succession scenario.
In terms of relations with Israel, this has not officially changed at the core; the main change here is the aspiration of the Egyptian people for a foreign policy that befits revolutionary Egypt an expression of the dignity of an exceptional people. This was met with an expected hostile campaign by Israel, similar to ones which occured whenever the ruler of Egypt changes; it happened when Sadat left and it was especially acute after the overthrow of a regime which was described as “a strategic asset” for Israel.
The issue of Egyptian natural gas going to Israel is a matter of corruption and wasting Egyptian resources. The Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum sold Egypt’s natural gas to the East Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG) owned by Hussein Salem, who managed Mubarak’s finances, and we don’t know at what price the gas was bought or sold to Israel. Egypt’s demand to revise the price of gas exports is legitimate and is not a hostile move against Israel. I doubt Egypt would refuse to sell natural gas to Israel at world prices.
As for Palestinian national reconciliation, change occurred for all parties. Egypt was liberated from the pact of selling Egypt’s regional role for services in the succession project; meanwhile the positions of Hamas and Fatah were transformed after the spirit of Tahrir Square swept through Gaza and Ramallah where demonstrators chanted: “The people demand an end to divisions”. These are the slogans of Tahrir Square which carried a discreet threat to the rulers there, and confirmed the aspirations of the Palestinian people for freedom, democracy and ending divisions.
Hamas revised its position when the head of its Political Bureau refused Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s request to condemn anti-regime protests, which are sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood there. Mishaal refused to denounce his group’s parent-movement and had to find another home for Hamas’s Political Bureau away from Damascus, which has stopped protecting the bureau and its members.
Fatah and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas also altered their position after years of extending his hand in peace to Israel, and was repaid by humiliation and derision for being a weak president who does not have control over the Gaza Strip. Everyone changed, which made the conclusion of the Egyptian proposal possible as it stands. The parties agreed to sign and postponed many problematic issues until the interim period although there is no guarantee they will be resolved.
The natural outcome of this is permanently re-opening the Rafah border crossing, which had been open from 2005 until Hamas took over power in Gaza in June, 2007. In the period that followed, it was open two days a weeks to allow Palestinians through since it is a crossing for individuals not trucks. Abu Mazen no longer objects to opening the border crossing as part of the reconciliation process, and in return for Hamas’s agreement to reconcile and let the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) control negotiations with Israel until a political settlement is reached according to international legitimacy.
This settlement would be proposed to the Palestinian parliament or the Palestinian people in a referendum. Several European countries, such as France, Germany and Britain, understood the deal and welcomed the reconciliation agreement. Washington did not strongly object but asked for more time to look into the matter before commenting, which is a positive sign.
As for Egyptian-Iranian relations, these are too complicated to restore in a short period, because the boycott is not only in Cairo’s hands but is also based on complex ties since the Iranian revolution in 1979. There are dozens of unresolved issues which require a long time to settle, mostly regarding the dynamic of interaction between two regional powers. Revolutionary Egypt’s decision to expel an Iranian diplomat is an example of the deep complications in bilateral relations.
Yes, there are core changes in Egypt’s foreign policy, namely an end to selling Egypt’s regional role for the benefit of the succession scenario. Accordingly, a new foreign policy was drawn to represent a major regional power which wants to restore its influential role based on its capabilities and the implications of such a role. Anyone who understands this transformation will be able to maintain their ties with Egypt, and anyone who does not or insists on misunderstanding will continue to talk about root changes in Egypt’s foreign policy and jeopardise their bilateral relationship with revolutionary Egypt.
13 Jun 2011, Al Ahram Online
Emad Gad
After the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and the formation of Essam Sharaf’s cabinet which brought in Nabil El-Arabi as foreign minister, there has been much talk about core changes in Egypt’s foreign policy. These analyses are based on statements by El-Arabi regarding Egypt’s readiness to restore relations with Iran, and readings of statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning about alterations in Egypt’s foreign policies, as well as signs of these modifications.
Meanwhile, several factors came together to form a picture that is being promoted as an example of the deep nature of these changes in Egyptian foreign policy, as if Egypt has joined the “opposing axis” or is on its way to join the ranks of “snubbed” countries or the camp hostile to the West, such as Iran. These factors include Egypt’s request to revise the price of natural gas exported to Israel, Cairo’s sponsorship of the reconciliation process between Fatah and Hamas and the decision to permanently open the Rafah border crossing starting on 28 May.
A closer look at these claims reveals that these are deliberate statements intended to group elements together to prove actual and expected changes in Egypt’s foreign policy. Let us first deconstruct these elements and discuss Egypt’s foreign policy during Mubarak’s era. Mubarak manipulated Egypt’s foreign policy in the last five years to create a succession scenario for his son Gamal. To this end, he used the results of the Palestinian 2006 parliamentary elections – which brought in Hamas as a majority – to send messages to the West, and the US in particular, asserting that any honest and transparent elections will bring Islamists into power. The people of Egypt are not “mature” enough to exercise democracy, he argued, and allowing political Islam to take over the helm would harm the interests of the West and dissolve the peace treaty with Israel.
Israel’s war against Lebanon also broke out in 2006, and private Egyptian newspapers distributed photos of Hassan Nasrallah, which gave Mubarak another card to play in the plot of succession by saying that Egyptian public opinion is fanatical and could usher in figures who oppose the West and Israel. Therefore, it would be best not to demand democracy or human rights in Egypt until the people become more seasoned.
After that, Mubarak arrived at a pact with the US whereby he was left to his own devices regarding domestic issues, since he knew his people best, particularly how to control them and safeguard US interests and the peace treaty with Israel. In return, Egypt would apply any regional policies dictated by Washington, which indirectly means Israel.
Once Mubarak was removed from power this pact collapsed, and Egyptian foreign policy was liberated from the limitations of the succession project and adopted the policies of a major regional power with a dignity and independence which commands respect and appreciation. Cairo began implementing foreign policies which serve Egypt’s interests, not the interests of the succession scenario and was no longer hostage to it. This is the actual change has that occurred in Egypt’s foreign policy, namely liberation from a pact to sell Egypt’s regional role to serve the succession scenario.
In terms of relations with Israel, this has not officially changed at the core; the main change here is the aspiration of the Egyptian people for a foreign policy that befits revolutionary Egypt an expression of the dignity of an exceptional people. This was met with an expected hostile campaign by Israel, similar to ones which occured whenever the ruler of Egypt changes; it happened when Sadat left and it was especially acute after the overthrow of a regime which was described as “a strategic asset” for Israel.
The issue of Egyptian natural gas going to Israel is a matter of corruption and wasting Egyptian resources. The Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum sold Egypt’s natural gas to the East Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG) owned by Hussein Salem, who managed Mubarak’s finances, and we don’t know at what price the gas was bought or sold to Israel. Egypt’s demand to revise the price of gas exports is legitimate and is not a hostile move against Israel. I doubt Egypt would refuse to sell natural gas to Israel at world prices.
As for Palestinian national reconciliation, change occurred for all parties. Egypt was liberated from the pact of selling Egypt’s regional role for services in the succession project; meanwhile the positions of Hamas and Fatah were transformed after the spirit of Tahrir Square swept through Gaza and Ramallah where demonstrators chanted: “The people demand an end to divisions”. These are the slogans of Tahrir Square which carried a discreet threat to the rulers there, and confirmed the aspirations of the Palestinian people for freedom, democracy and ending divisions.
Hamas revised its position when the head of its Political Bureau refused Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s request to condemn anti-regime protests, which are sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood there. Mishaal refused to denounce his group’s parent-movement and had to find another home for Hamas’s Political Bureau away from Damascus, which has stopped protecting the bureau and its members.
Fatah and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas also altered their position after years of extending his hand in peace to Israel, and was repaid by humiliation and derision for being a weak president who does not have control over the Gaza Strip. Everyone changed, which made the conclusion of the Egyptian proposal possible as it stands. The parties agreed to sign and postponed many problematic issues until the interim period although there is no guarantee they will be resolved.
The natural outcome of this is permanently re-opening the Rafah border crossing, which had been open from 2005 until Hamas took over power in Gaza in June, 2007. In the period that followed, it was open two days a weeks to allow Palestinians through since it is a crossing for individuals not trucks. Abu Mazen no longer objects to opening the border crossing as part of the reconciliation process, and in return for Hamas’s agreement to reconcile and let the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) control negotiations with Israel until a political settlement is reached according to international legitimacy.
This settlement would be proposed to the Palestinian parliament or the Palestinian people in a referendum. Several European countries, such as France, Germany and Britain, understood the deal and welcomed the reconciliation agreement. Washington did not strongly object but asked for more time to look into the matter before commenting, which is a positive sign.
As for Egyptian-Iranian relations, these are too complicated to restore in a short period, because the boycott is not only in Cairo’s hands but is also based on complex ties since the Iranian revolution in 1979. There are dozens of unresolved issues which require a long time to settle, mostly regarding the dynamic of interaction between two regional powers. Revolutionary Egypt’s decision to expel an Iranian diplomat is an example of the deep complications in bilateral relations.
Yes, there are core changes in Egypt’s foreign policy, namely an end to selling Egypt’s regional role for the benefit of the succession scenario. Accordingly, a new foreign policy was drawn to represent a major regional power which wants to restore its influential role based on its capabilities and the implications of such a role. Anyone who understands this transformation will be able to maintain their ties with Egypt, and anyone who does not or insists on misunderstanding will continue to talk about root changes in Egypt’s foreign policy and jeopardise their bilateral relationship with revolutionary Egypt.
segunda-feira, 13 de junho de 2011
America's next war theater: Syria and Lebanon?
Washington's War against the Resistance Bloc
10 June 2011, Global Research http://www.globalresearch.ca
By Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
Washington and its allies, Israel and the Al-Sauds, are taking advantage of the upheavals in the Arab World. They are now working to dismantle the Resistance Bloc and weaken any drive for democracy in the Arab World. The geo-political chessboard is now being prepared for a broader confrontation that will target Tehran and include Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinians.
Tying Hezbollah’s Hands through External and Internal Pressure
In Lebanon, there is a deadlock in regards to the formation of a Lebanese government. Michel Sleiman, who holds the presidency and the new Lebanese prime minister have been delaying the formation of the cabinet in a political row with Michel Aoun, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement.
It may be possible that the formation of a new Lebanese cabinet is being delayed deliberately to keep Lebanon neutralized on the foreign policy front.
The U.N. Security Council and several U.N. bodies are all being used by the U.S. and the E.U. to put pressure on Lebanon. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is taking his orders fom Washington. He has contributed to providiing legitimacy to U.S. NATO led wars. Moscow has openly accused Ban Ki Moon of treachery for his 2008 secret dealings with NATO.
It is in this context that the U.N. is being used as a forum for insidious attempts to internationalize the issue of weapons held by the Lebanese Resistance, with a view to disarming it. Despite the fact that U.N. Resolution 1559 is no longer relevant, the Special Representative for the Implementation of Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen, still remains active and issues reports against Hezbollah.
The envoys of the U.N. to Lebanon resemble colonial figures making uninvited edicts in Beirut and working as agents of Washington, Brussels, and Tel Aviv. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which has an entire division in the U.S. State Department, is also a loaded political weapon that Washington is planniong on using against Lebanon and Syria.
An international tribunal was formed pertaining to the circumnstances of the the assassination of Rafic Al-Hariri. Hariri at the time of his murder had no official state position, but an international tribunal has been created for his case alone. On the other hand the international community has taken no interest in forming any type of tribunals to investigate the assassination of thousands of people killed in Lebanon. What does this say about the STL and the justice being sought?
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has also been complicit in Israeli violations against Lebanon. Even the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRAW) has been infiltrated with officials that are supportive of Israeli crimes against Palestinians and Lebanese. This was demonstrated by Christopher Gunness, the spokesperson of UNRAW, in a May 15, 2011 interview with the Israeli military. While Israel's IDF was firing on unarmed civilian protesters during Nakba Day 2011, Gunness reaffirmed that UNRAW was working in the interest of Israel's national security, while also accusing the Palestinians of committing terrorist acts against Israel. Even the Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip was whitewashed by the UNRAW spokesperson.
The absence of a new cabinet in Lebanon has also allowed Saad Hariri and the March 14 Alliance to continue having an ominous hand in managing Lebanon’s affairs. This also buys time for the STL, which can move forward without being challenged by a Lebanese government in Beirut that would be hostile to the ISF. In this regard, a new government in Beirut would most certainly question to legitmacy of the STL.
Moreover, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) of Lebanon is also being used by the Saad Hariri government against Hezbollah and the political opponents of Hariri family. The ISF may even have a hand in working against Damascus and helping promote violence in Syria. The ISF takes its orders directly from the Hariri family. The latter also controls the Lebanese government.
Because of the free hand given to Saad Hariri and his cronies (largely due to the absence of a functioning cabinet in Beirut), Ziad Baroud, the acting interior minister of Lebanon, has refused to sign any more papers from his ministry. Baroud has taken this position, because he believes that the ISF is acting covertly and without his approval or supervision. In this regard, the ISF has refused to follow the orders of Ziad Baroud to allow Charbel Al-Nahhas, the acting telecommunications minister of Lebanon, to enter ISF headquarters for a routine check. The ISF was clearly trying to hide its operations and was acting to prevent Al-Nahhas and his team from going to certain floors at ISF headquarters.
It is also no secret that Lebanon is a nest of intelligence agents and operatives from the U.S., the E.U., Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Their objective is to confront and dismantle Hezbollah and its coalition.
In 2006, during the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon the embassies of E.U. members were also collecting data against Hezbollah. The Al-Sauds have helped facilitate the links between Israel and the network of spies in Lebanon. This is demonstrated by the clear link between Sheikh Mohammed Ali Hussein, the Shiite cleric working caught working for Israel, and the Al-Sauds.
In tune with all this, Hezbollah is constantly accused of being an instrument of Iran. Recently, Hezbollah was blamed alongside Iran for stirring protests in the Persian Gulf, specifically in Bahrain and the Shiite-dominated areas of Saudi Arabia. In this regard Lebanese citizens, regardless of their faith in many cases, have also been singled out by the Khaliji regimes and expelled from the Persian Gulf. This is part of a sectarian card to create regional divisions and hate. Within Lebanon it has been used by the Saad Hariri faction to target Hezbollah and its allies. Hariri has ironically accused Iran of interfering in Bahrain at the very moment the Saudi military invaded the island-state to keep the Al-Khalifas in power.
The petro-sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf are now systematically preventing Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Pakistani citizens from entering their borders. Kuwait has justified this by saying that there could be trouble within Kuwait due to political instability in these countries.
Destabilizing Syria
Damascus has been under pressure to capitulate to the edicts of Washington and the European Union. This has been part of a longstanding project. Regime change or voluntary subordination by the Syrian regime are the goals. This includes subordinating Syrian foreign policy and de-linking Syrian from its strategic alliance with Iran and its membership within the Resistance Bloc.
Syria is run by an authoritarian oligarchy which has used brute force in dealing with its citizens. The riots in Syria, however, are complex. They cannot be viewed as a straighforward quest for liberty and democracy. There has been an attempt by the U.S. and the E.U. to use the riots in Syria to pressure and intimidate the Syrian leadership. Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, and the March 14 Alliance have all played a role in supporting an armed insurrection.
The Al-Sauds have also helped drown out any authentic calls for democratic reform and marginalized the democratic elements in the Syrian opposition during the protests and riots. In this regard the Al-Sauds have supported both sectarian factions as well as terrorist elements, which quesiton the foundations of religious tolerance in Syria. These elements are mostly Salafist extremists, like Fatah Al-Islam and the new extremist political movements being organized in Egypt. They have also been rallying against the Alawites, the Druze, and Syrian Christians.
The violence in Syria has been supported from the outside with a view of taking advantage of the internal tensions and the anger in Syria. Aside from the violent reaction of the Syrian Army, media lies have been used and bogus footage has been aired. Money and weapons have also been funnelled to elements of the Syrian opposition by the U.S., the E.U., the March 14 Alliance, Jordan, and the Khalijis. Funding has also been provided to ominous and unpopular foreign-based Syrian opposition figures, while weapons caches were smuggled from Jordan and Lebanon into Syria.
The events in Syria are also tied to Iran, the longstanding strategic ally of Damascus. It is not by chance that Senator Lieberman was demanding publicly that the Obama Administration and NATO attack Syria and Iran like Libya. It is also not coincidental that Iran was included in the sanctions against Syria. The hands of the Syrian military and government have now been tied internally as a new and broader offensive is being prepared that will target both Syria and Iran.
Syria and the Levantine Gas Fields in the Eastern Mediterranean
Syria is the central piece of two important energy corridors. The first links Turkey and the Caspian to Israel and the Red Sea and the second links Iraq to the Mediterranean. The surrender of Syria would mean that Washington and its allies would control these energy routes. It would also mean that the large natural gas fields off the Lebanese and Syrian coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean would be out of reach for China and would instead go to the E.U., Israel, and the U.S.
The Eastern Mediterranean gas fields have been the subject of negotiations between the E.U., Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Aside from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, the existence of the Levantine natural gas fields is also the reason why the Kremlin has created a military foothold in Syria for the Russian Federation. This has been done by upgrading Soviet-era naval facilities in Syria. Moreover, it has been Iran that has agreed to explore and help develop these natural gas fields off the Levantine coast for Beirut and Damascus.
Hamas-Fatah Rapprochement
There is a strong correlation between war in Southwest Asia and increased talk at the official level about Palestinian statehood. Hopes of Palestinian statehood have always been used twice to discharge pressure in the Arab World built from rising tensions from war preparations against Iraq. The first time was by George H.W. Bush Sr. and the second time by George W. Bush Jr., who was praised for being the first U.S. president to seriously talk about a Palestinian state.
Even as he flip-flops on his position, Obama is also now talking about a Palestinian state. Moreover, rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah has taken place as the count-down towards international recognition of Palestinian statehood begins. The Israelis have also released frozen funds to the Palestinians, which they refused to do before due to Hamas.
The rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas has also served to tie the hands of Hamas. Hamas will have to be careful not to effectively become a junior partner in governing Palestine under Israeli occupation. Hamas must effectively now modify its stance in its partnership in a unity government with Fatah. In all likelihood Tel Aviv and Washington will seek to impose Fatah as the senior partner of the Palestinian Authority. In a manner of speaking, Hamas is being domesticated indirectly by Israel and Washington.
Instability in Pakistan
The announcement that Osama bin Laden has been killed by U.S. forces has contributed to a process of covert political destabilization within Pakistan. There has been a calculated effort to present Osama bin Laden as a popular and venerated figure for Muslims. This is with a view of supporting the so-called “Clash of Civilizations.”
At the same time the U.S. government is starting a media campaign against Pakistan. Islamabad has been portrayed as harbouring Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network. In reality any Pakistani involvement with terrorists has been ordered and directed by Washington. There is a much more complicated story to all this, but what is happening in reality is that Pakistan as a nation is being targeted for dismantlement.
The dismantlement and destabilization of Pakistan would serve three objectives.
1. Promoting a scenario of a war with Iran: Pakistan would not be under threat of a takeover by revolutionaries that would side with Iran and its allies.
2. The targetting of Chinese interests in Pakistan, including the energy corridor from Iran to China (the Chinese port in Gwadar), which transits through Pakistan.
3. Regional destabilization in a key area of Eurasia where Southwest Asia, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent meet. This area extends from Iran and Afghanistan to Pakistan, India, and Western China. At the same time Washington also wants to neutralize the Pakistani nuclear program.
The U.S. has also announced that it has the right to violate the national boundaries of countries which harbour terrorists as well as send troops to these countries as part of the “war on terrorism.” Hillary Clinton has justified Washington stance by saying that U.S. forces would be assassinating terrorists. This is merely an opening door for creating a pretext for military intervention in countries such as Iran or Syria.
10 June 2011, Global Research http://www.globalresearch.ca
By Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
Washington and its allies, Israel and the Al-Sauds, are taking advantage of the upheavals in the Arab World. They are now working to dismantle the Resistance Bloc and weaken any drive for democracy in the Arab World. The geo-political chessboard is now being prepared for a broader confrontation that will target Tehran and include Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinians.
Tying Hezbollah’s Hands through External and Internal Pressure
In Lebanon, there is a deadlock in regards to the formation of a Lebanese government. Michel Sleiman, who holds the presidency and the new Lebanese prime minister have been delaying the formation of the cabinet in a political row with Michel Aoun, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement.
It may be possible that the formation of a new Lebanese cabinet is being delayed deliberately to keep Lebanon neutralized on the foreign policy front.
The U.N. Security Council and several U.N. bodies are all being used by the U.S. and the E.U. to put pressure on Lebanon. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is taking his orders fom Washington. He has contributed to providiing legitimacy to U.S. NATO led wars. Moscow has openly accused Ban Ki Moon of treachery for his 2008 secret dealings with NATO.
It is in this context that the U.N. is being used as a forum for insidious attempts to internationalize the issue of weapons held by the Lebanese Resistance, with a view to disarming it. Despite the fact that U.N. Resolution 1559 is no longer relevant, the Special Representative for the Implementation of Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen, still remains active and issues reports against Hezbollah.
The envoys of the U.N. to Lebanon resemble colonial figures making uninvited edicts in Beirut and working as agents of Washington, Brussels, and Tel Aviv. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which has an entire division in the U.S. State Department, is also a loaded political weapon that Washington is planniong on using against Lebanon and Syria.
An international tribunal was formed pertaining to the circumnstances of the the assassination of Rafic Al-Hariri. Hariri at the time of his murder had no official state position, but an international tribunal has been created for his case alone. On the other hand the international community has taken no interest in forming any type of tribunals to investigate the assassination of thousands of people killed in Lebanon. What does this say about the STL and the justice being sought?
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has also been complicit in Israeli violations against Lebanon. Even the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRAW) has been infiltrated with officials that are supportive of Israeli crimes against Palestinians and Lebanese. This was demonstrated by Christopher Gunness, the spokesperson of UNRAW, in a May 15, 2011 interview with the Israeli military. While Israel's IDF was firing on unarmed civilian protesters during Nakba Day 2011, Gunness reaffirmed that UNRAW was working in the interest of Israel's national security, while also accusing the Palestinians of committing terrorist acts against Israel. Even the Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip was whitewashed by the UNRAW spokesperson.
The absence of a new cabinet in Lebanon has also allowed Saad Hariri and the March 14 Alliance to continue having an ominous hand in managing Lebanon’s affairs. This also buys time for the STL, which can move forward without being challenged by a Lebanese government in Beirut that would be hostile to the ISF. In this regard, a new government in Beirut would most certainly question to legitmacy of the STL.
Moreover, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) of Lebanon is also being used by the Saad Hariri government against Hezbollah and the political opponents of Hariri family. The ISF may even have a hand in working against Damascus and helping promote violence in Syria. The ISF takes its orders directly from the Hariri family. The latter also controls the Lebanese government.
Because of the free hand given to Saad Hariri and his cronies (largely due to the absence of a functioning cabinet in Beirut), Ziad Baroud, the acting interior minister of Lebanon, has refused to sign any more papers from his ministry. Baroud has taken this position, because he believes that the ISF is acting covertly and without his approval or supervision. In this regard, the ISF has refused to follow the orders of Ziad Baroud to allow Charbel Al-Nahhas, the acting telecommunications minister of Lebanon, to enter ISF headquarters for a routine check. The ISF was clearly trying to hide its operations and was acting to prevent Al-Nahhas and his team from going to certain floors at ISF headquarters.
It is also no secret that Lebanon is a nest of intelligence agents and operatives from the U.S., the E.U., Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Their objective is to confront and dismantle Hezbollah and its coalition.
In 2006, during the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon the embassies of E.U. members were also collecting data against Hezbollah. The Al-Sauds have helped facilitate the links between Israel and the network of spies in Lebanon. This is demonstrated by the clear link between Sheikh Mohammed Ali Hussein, the Shiite cleric working caught working for Israel, and the Al-Sauds.
In tune with all this, Hezbollah is constantly accused of being an instrument of Iran. Recently, Hezbollah was blamed alongside Iran for stirring protests in the Persian Gulf, specifically in Bahrain and the Shiite-dominated areas of Saudi Arabia. In this regard Lebanese citizens, regardless of their faith in many cases, have also been singled out by the Khaliji regimes and expelled from the Persian Gulf. This is part of a sectarian card to create regional divisions and hate. Within Lebanon it has been used by the Saad Hariri faction to target Hezbollah and its allies. Hariri has ironically accused Iran of interfering in Bahrain at the very moment the Saudi military invaded the island-state to keep the Al-Khalifas in power.
The petro-sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf are now systematically preventing Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Pakistani citizens from entering their borders. Kuwait has justified this by saying that there could be trouble within Kuwait due to political instability in these countries.
Destabilizing Syria
Damascus has been under pressure to capitulate to the edicts of Washington and the European Union. This has been part of a longstanding project. Regime change or voluntary subordination by the Syrian regime are the goals. This includes subordinating Syrian foreign policy and de-linking Syrian from its strategic alliance with Iran and its membership within the Resistance Bloc.
Syria is run by an authoritarian oligarchy which has used brute force in dealing with its citizens. The riots in Syria, however, are complex. They cannot be viewed as a straighforward quest for liberty and democracy. There has been an attempt by the U.S. and the E.U. to use the riots in Syria to pressure and intimidate the Syrian leadership. Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, and the March 14 Alliance have all played a role in supporting an armed insurrection.
The Al-Sauds have also helped drown out any authentic calls for democratic reform and marginalized the democratic elements in the Syrian opposition during the protests and riots. In this regard the Al-Sauds have supported both sectarian factions as well as terrorist elements, which quesiton the foundations of religious tolerance in Syria. These elements are mostly Salafist extremists, like Fatah Al-Islam and the new extremist political movements being organized in Egypt. They have also been rallying against the Alawites, the Druze, and Syrian Christians.
The violence in Syria has been supported from the outside with a view of taking advantage of the internal tensions and the anger in Syria. Aside from the violent reaction of the Syrian Army, media lies have been used and bogus footage has been aired. Money and weapons have also been funnelled to elements of the Syrian opposition by the U.S., the E.U., the March 14 Alliance, Jordan, and the Khalijis. Funding has also been provided to ominous and unpopular foreign-based Syrian opposition figures, while weapons caches were smuggled from Jordan and Lebanon into Syria.
The events in Syria are also tied to Iran, the longstanding strategic ally of Damascus. It is not by chance that Senator Lieberman was demanding publicly that the Obama Administration and NATO attack Syria and Iran like Libya. It is also not coincidental that Iran was included in the sanctions against Syria. The hands of the Syrian military and government have now been tied internally as a new and broader offensive is being prepared that will target both Syria and Iran.
Syria and the Levantine Gas Fields in the Eastern Mediterranean
Syria is the central piece of two important energy corridors. The first links Turkey and the Caspian to Israel and the Red Sea and the second links Iraq to the Mediterranean. The surrender of Syria would mean that Washington and its allies would control these energy routes. It would also mean that the large natural gas fields off the Lebanese and Syrian coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean would be out of reach for China and would instead go to the E.U., Israel, and the U.S.
The Eastern Mediterranean gas fields have been the subject of negotiations between the E.U., Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Aside from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, the existence of the Levantine natural gas fields is also the reason why the Kremlin has created a military foothold in Syria for the Russian Federation. This has been done by upgrading Soviet-era naval facilities in Syria. Moreover, it has been Iran that has agreed to explore and help develop these natural gas fields off the Levantine coast for Beirut and Damascus.
Hamas-Fatah Rapprochement
There is a strong correlation between war in Southwest Asia and increased talk at the official level about Palestinian statehood. Hopes of Palestinian statehood have always been used twice to discharge pressure in the Arab World built from rising tensions from war preparations against Iraq. The first time was by George H.W. Bush Sr. and the second time by George W. Bush Jr., who was praised for being the first U.S. president to seriously talk about a Palestinian state.
Even as he flip-flops on his position, Obama is also now talking about a Palestinian state. Moreover, rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah has taken place as the count-down towards international recognition of Palestinian statehood begins. The Israelis have also released frozen funds to the Palestinians, which they refused to do before due to Hamas.
The rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas has also served to tie the hands of Hamas. Hamas will have to be careful not to effectively become a junior partner in governing Palestine under Israeli occupation. Hamas must effectively now modify its stance in its partnership in a unity government with Fatah. In all likelihood Tel Aviv and Washington will seek to impose Fatah as the senior partner of the Palestinian Authority. In a manner of speaking, Hamas is being domesticated indirectly by Israel and Washington.
Instability in Pakistan
The announcement that Osama bin Laden has been killed by U.S. forces has contributed to a process of covert political destabilization within Pakistan. There has been a calculated effort to present Osama bin Laden as a popular and venerated figure for Muslims. This is with a view of supporting the so-called “Clash of Civilizations.”
At the same time the U.S. government is starting a media campaign against Pakistan. Islamabad has been portrayed as harbouring Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network. In reality any Pakistani involvement with terrorists has been ordered and directed by Washington. There is a much more complicated story to all this, but what is happening in reality is that Pakistan as a nation is being targeted for dismantlement.
The dismantlement and destabilization of Pakistan would serve three objectives.
1. Promoting a scenario of a war with Iran: Pakistan would not be under threat of a takeover by revolutionaries that would side with Iran and its allies.
2. The targetting of Chinese interests in Pakistan, including the energy corridor from Iran to China (the Chinese port in Gwadar), which transits through Pakistan.
3. Regional destabilization in a key area of Eurasia where Southwest Asia, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent meet. This area extends from Iran and Afghanistan to Pakistan, India, and Western China. At the same time Washington also wants to neutralize the Pakistani nuclear program.
The U.S. has also announced that it has the right to violate the national boundaries of countries which harbour terrorists as well as send troops to these countries as part of the “war on terrorism.” Hillary Clinton has justified Washington stance by saying that U.S. forces would be assassinating terrorists. This is merely an opening door for creating a pretext for military intervention in countries such as Iran or Syria.
sexta-feira, 10 de junho de 2011
Le 18 à Marseille, pour la seconde flottille de la liberté
10 juin 2011, Association France Palestine Solidarité http://www.france-palestine.org (France)
La Flottille de la liberté II est un acte fort et important de solidarité avec le peuple palestinien. Face à l’inertie des gouvernements et leur complicité, notamment celle du gouvernement français, avec l’État colonialiste et criminel, la mobilisation des peuples est plus que nécessaire.
Résultant de centaines d’initiatives unitaires à travers le pays, plus de 500 000 euros ont été collectés pièce après pièce grâce à un soutien populaire massif.
Dans une tribune publiée dans plusieurs médias, 402 élues (1) et responsables politiques apportent leur soutien à cette action. Au-delà du bateau français, c’est une flottille internationale qui abordera les côtes de Gaza à la fin juin 2011. Des bateaux en provenance du Canada, d’Espagne, des États-Unis, de France, de Grèce, d’Irlande, d’Italie et de Turquie, embarqueront 1 500 passagers en provenance de plus de 60 pays.
Pressions et menaces de l’État d’Israël ne font que renforcer la détermination des organisateurs et participants à combattre concrètement le blocus inhumain de Gaza. Que de condamnations verbales des dirigeants occidentaux contre ce blocus, mais aucune mesure contraignante pour que ce crime cesse ! Ils osent même demander aux citoyennes et citoyens de renoncer à embarquer, reconnaissant de fait qu’Israël peut encore commettre des crimes comme cela fut le cas lors de la première flottille de la liberté, dont neuf militants furent assassinés.
Même pas peur, nous irons à Gaza par la mer, le blocus tombera!
Si depuis quelques jours la frontière Égypte/Gaza est « ouverte », elle n’autorise pas l’entrée des produits indispensables à la population, dont Israël bloque toujours la livraison. Dans la semaine du 26 mai au 1er juin, aucune marchandise n’a pu sortir de Gaza (2) pour l’exportation, fleurs, fruits et légumes pourrissent sur place. La frontière est « ouverte » mais son usage est interdit à des milliers de Gazaouis, faute de passeport.
Malgré l’accord Fatah/ Hamas, plus de 15 000 Gazaouis sont toujours en attente de ce précieux document délivré par l’Autorité palestinienne de Ramallah, sans aucune garantie de l’obtenir par ailleurs.
La Flottille de la liberté II est un acte fort et important de solidarité avec le peuple palestinien. Face à l’inertie des gouvernements et leur complicité, notamment celle du gouvernement français, avec l’État colonialiste et criminel, la mobilisation des peuples est plus que nécessaire. Comme l’a dit Myriam Martin, porte-parole du NPA, lors du meeting du 31 mai : « On sait qu’après la flottille, au-delà de la lutte pour lever le blocus de Gaza, il faudra continuer à se battre, à développer la solidarité avec le peuple palestinien parce que c’est le combat intégral pour le droit et la justice qui est en jeu. Car il n’y aura pas d’issue sans justice, car il n’y aura pas de paix sans justice ! Car il n’y aura pas de justice sans retour des réfugiés et des prisonniers politiques […] il n’y aura pas de justice sans que soit respecté un droit fondamental et inaliénable, celui du droit à l’autodétermination du peuple palestinien!»
Le NPA sera présent sur les bateaux, comme il est présent dans la campagne Boycott-désinvestissement-sanctions contre Israël.
Le samedi 18 juin, nous serons des milliers à Marseille, pour accompagner le bateau français de la seconde flottille internationale de la liberté.[1]
[1] 1.http://unbateaupourgaza.fr/index.ph... 2. http://www.pchrgaza.org
Publié par le NPA, dans le n° 106, page 10 de Tout est à Nous
Titre modifié : CL, Afps
La Flottille de la liberté II est un acte fort et important de solidarité avec le peuple palestinien. Face à l’inertie des gouvernements et leur complicité, notamment celle du gouvernement français, avec l’État colonialiste et criminel, la mobilisation des peuples est plus que nécessaire.
Résultant de centaines d’initiatives unitaires à travers le pays, plus de 500 000 euros ont été collectés pièce après pièce grâce à un soutien populaire massif.
Dans une tribune publiée dans plusieurs médias, 402 élues (1) et responsables politiques apportent leur soutien à cette action. Au-delà du bateau français, c’est une flottille internationale qui abordera les côtes de Gaza à la fin juin 2011. Des bateaux en provenance du Canada, d’Espagne, des États-Unis, de France, de Grèce, d’Irlande, d’Italie et de Turquie, embarqueront 1 500 passagers en provenance de plus de 60 pays.
Pressions et menaces de l’État d’Israël ne font que renforcer la détermination des organisateurs et participants à combattre concrètement le blocus inhumain de Gaza. Que de condamnations verbales des dirigeants occidentaux contre ce blocus, mais aucune mesure contraignante pour que ce crime cesse ! Ils osent même demander aux citoyennes et citoyens de renoncer à embarquer, reconnaissant de fait qu’Israël peut encore commettre des crimes comme cela fut le cas lors de la première flottille de la liberté, dont neuf militants furent assassinés.
Même pas peur, nous irons à Gaza par la mer, le blocus tombera!
Si depuis quelques jours la frontière Égypte/Gaza est « ouverte », elle n’autorise pas l’entrée des produits indispensables à la population, dont Israël bloque toujours la livraison. Dans la semaine du 26 mai au 1er juin, aucune marchandise n’a pu sortir de Gaza (2) pour l’exportation, fleurs, fruits et légumes pourrissent sur place. La frontière est « ouverte » mais son usage est interdit à des milliers de Gazaouis, faute de passeport.
Malgré l’accord Fatah/ Hamas, plus de 15 000 Gazaouis sont toujours en attente de ce précieux document délivré par l’Autorité palestinienne de Ramallah, sans aucune garantie de l’obtenir par ailleurs.
La Flottille de la liberté II est un acte fort et important de solidarité avec le peuple palestinien. Face à l’inertie des gouvernements et leur complicité, notamment celle du gouvernement français, avec l’État colonialiste et criminel, la mobilisation des peuples est plus que nécessaire. Comme l’a dit Myriam Martin, porte-parole du NPA, lors du meeting du 31 mai : « On sait qu’après la flottille, au-delà de la lutte pour lever le blocus de Gaza, il faudra continuer à se battre, à développer la solidarité avec le peuple palestinien parce que c’est le combat intégral pour le droit et la justice qui est en jeu. Car il n’y aura pas d’issue sans justice, car il n’y aura pas de paix sans justice ! Car il n’y aura pas de justice sans retour des réfugiés et des prisonniers politiques […] il n’y aura pas de justice sans que soit respecté un droit fondamental et inaliénable, celui du droit à l’autodétermination du peuple palestinien!»
Le NPA sera présent sur les bateaux, comme il est présent dans la campagne Boycott-désinvestissement-sanctions contre Israël.
Le samedi 18 juin, nous serons des milliers à Marseille, pour accompagner le bateau français de la seconde flottille internationale de la liberté.[1]
[1] 1.http://unbateaupourgaza.fr/index.ph... 2. http://www.pchrgaza.org
Publié par le NPA, dans le n° 106, page 10 de Tout est à Nous
Titre modifié : CL, Afps
Gaza, the most Facebook friendly place on earth
Social media sites are a force to reckon with in the Palestinian territories, says former PA communications minister, adding that if a new uprising erupts, that is where it will begin to brew.
5 June 2011, Haaretz הארץ (Israel)
By Natasha Mozgovaya
WASHINGTON - Although his father Mamdouh Saidam was one of the founders of Fatah, Dr. Sabri Saidam, deputy secretary general of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, entered the political arena at the relatively late age of 34. It was then that he was appointed minister of communications and information technology in the Palestinian government. Today, no longer in government, the former "Mr. Technology" of the Palestinian Authority prefers the hat of researcher and Palestinian Internet guru. He is also one of the activists behind the establishment of the Palestinian domain ps.
"Coming from the IT field, I can tell you honestly that I've always felt as if I were carving in stone - getting computers or talking about e-government in Palestine was mission impossible," he says in an interview with Haaretz. "Now all the politicians are meeting bloggers and talking to them. There was no party interested in these people until the events in Tunisia and Egypt. They were considered to be time-wasters, kids."
Saidam is in Washington now working with the Aspen Institute to promote entrepreneurship among young Palestinians. "All of a sudden, everybody wants to know and have a private session to talk about Facebook and how they can open an account," he says.
Half of Palestinian households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have computers, according to Saidam, and about 30 percent are connected to the Internet.
"When the demonstrations started in Tunisia, there were 600,000 Palestinian Facebook users, and 200,000 of them were posting about politics. Each one of these 200,000 Facebook users is influencing five people around him. We're talking about over a million Palestinians over the age of 18. In terms of population size, that's 33 percent. In Egypt, that would be 28 million Egyptians, but there it took only 2,890 bloggers and computer activists to do what was done. The moral of the story is that there is a critical mass of Palestinians waiting to see how things are going to swing."
Saidam believes that all those who stormed Israel's borders on Nakba Day were simply in rehearsal mode. "Those who have broken the fear barrier, will be willing to do it again," he says. "Israel focuses on September, but they ought to focus on the 5th of June, the anniversary of the Six-Day War. There are already increased calls to march into the borders again."
There are two schools of thought on the matter, he says. "There's one that says: 'You've done it once, thank God there weren't more casualties, but don't do it again. Go to the borders, amass as many people as you can, but don't cross, because Israel has now learned the lesson. They can go and camp for a while, and this camping will send a message to Israel and the world, and it will help the Palestinians to build up pressure as preparations are made for September.' The other school of thought says: 'No, let's break fences and charge.' There are more supporters of the second approach."
Saidam says that the PA is beginning to understand the power of the Internet, and many of its members now want to meet with bloggers and open an account. "But there is no Palestinian Wael Ghonim [the young Google marketing executive who became a symbol of the revolution] . . . It's the issue of getting bored of the fact that they see leaders who existed for dozens of years. They don't want any leaders."
The trigger, he says, were the demonstrations held in the West Bank on March 15, when young Palestinians marched and called for an end to the rift between Hamas and Fatah. Abu Mazen then announced that he would be willing to go to Gaza, and an agreement was hammered out. "The young people felt they had some influence on the decision," says Saidam. "And I am telling my peers that they should not only passively listen but allow young blood to flow into the decision making of the parties."
Saidam notes that even Abu Mazen has a Facebook account. "He has a page where he posts all his meetings at president.ps. He is interested, but he is overwhelmed. Whenever I talk to him about computers, he is extremely supportive, but he doesn't have time to surf the Internet. He has a lot on his plate."
Saidam finds it amusing that a member of Congress recently asked whether the Palestinians use the Internet: "Do Palestinians use the Internet? Who is to blame for this Congressman not knowing whether we use Internet or not? No wonder they gave Netanyahu 29 standing ovations . . . they are totally ignorant. I've been in meetings in Congress, and there is a major problem, and it's a problem of education. If they visit Palestine, it's usually a courtesy visit of two hours."
Gaza a Facebook champion
Per capita, says Saidam, the largest number of Facebook users in the world is in Gaza.
"That's one thing people don't know," he says. Per capita, the largest number of video conferencing in the world is also in the Palestinian territories. "The legislative council used to meet through video conferencing in the West Bank and Gaza," says Saidam.
"There were medical exams conducted over the Internet. My mother, who lives in Gaza, has a heart problem. She comes to Makassed Hospital in East Jerusalem for treatment. And in so many cases, she was refused permission to go back to Gaza after treatment. That's one of the reasons I was trying to promote Internet treatment so people wouldn't have to travel. People takes it for granted because the culture of IT is so embedded in society, but there are economic hardships that prevent people from acquiring technology, even though 94 percent use cell phones."
Several weeks ago, Saidam launched a project in the territories in which experienced Internet users volunteer to teach parents, especially stay-at-home mothers, to use the computer and to surf the Internet. Every Monday he has a radio program in which he advises listeners about what should not be publicized on Facebook. If they surf in other countries, he tells them, they need to bear in mind that the boss has the ability to surf their page, and in the case of Palestinians, so does the Shin Bet security service.
Another problem he cites is that Palestinians telecommunications services are provided by Israeli companies. "This is a prime source of intelligence for the Shabak [Shin Bet], Mossad and whatever," he says. "Everybody here publishes his or her beliefs and opinions and pictures and family news - everything. I tell them: You are the owner of the information. Whatever you are hesitant about - don't release it."
According to Saidam, Palestinian politicians are afraid of the Internet because they have no control over those who surf it. "But then they came to realize that it's something that is totally out of the censorship scissors, nobody can gag anybody else, it's a free world."
The Third Intifada Facebook page, he notes was created in Lebanon - not in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Facebook, under Jewish pressure, decided to close it. But being controversial is being famous. After Facebook closed it, there were several new pages."
Saidam says that young Palestinians are more committed than most would believe. "When you have a kid coming to his parents at Yarmouk refugee camp [in Syria], telling them he's going to have dinner in Jaffa, and they laugh at him and don't take him seriously. And then he ends up going with Israeli peace activists to Jaffa, has dinner there, gives an interview to Channel 10 and then gives himself up to the Israeli police. I think any Israeli general should worry.
"I lived in Gaza and the West Bank and have seen every adventure you can imagine, but to have this level of commitment, to come all the way to Jaffa, that's what makes me think that the 5th of May was only a rehearsal. Most young people are not talking about the peace process or the Arab initiative or the 1967 borders. If a new revolution erupts, it will be a revolution led by more sophisticated minds than those in the second intifada."
Right-wing domination
Unlike Netanyahu, he says, the Palestinians did not say "no" to everything. But Netanyahu's speech has, for all intents and purposes, eliminated the possibility that the PA will renege on its plans to ask the United Nations to vote on Palestinian statehood in September. "Our feeling is that Israeli society is dominated by right-wingers," he says. "I believe Netanyahu is receiving intelligence reports that the Palestinians won't make any further noise."
Still, the situation on the ground has changed, he says. The Palestinians have never enjoyed more support and have finally succeeded in building a consensus. The Israeli leadership, he notes, initially said that there was nothing to discuss because there was no unity among the Palestinians, and now it says that there is nothing to discuss because there is unity.
Saidam has the following to say about Hamas: "Nobody wants them to be part of the government, and they know it. Two things they won't do - they won't sit in the government, and they won't conduct the negotiations. And they know there will be a referendum."
Saidam thinks that Palestinian unity is a good thing. "We had our worst brain drain, not during the 40 plus years of occupation, but during the time of Palestinian disunity. Hamas, despite all the negative things, stands for 1967 borders, for the same political vision as Fatah."
Saidam lives in Ramallah with his two children. He has a doctorate from a British university but has never considered leaving his home. "My father was the deputy commander of the Palestinian forces in Jordan. He was diagnosed with cancer. He passed away during the conflict in 1971. I was four months old, and I had taken it upon myself that upon concluding my studies, I would go back to Palestine. In December 1995, I went to visit my family in the refugee camps of Gaza. I was encouraged to come back and live in Palestine and fulfill my dream. I have two kids, they are in Ramallah. No matter what happens, we are not leaving. I think even if we get slaughtered in our homes, we will not leave."
Every Palestinian who has lost a loved one in the conflict has a personal dilemma, he says. "In order to achieve peace with the Israelis, they have to understand our lives on the other side of the fence, how my mother spends 36 hours without electricity in Gaza, how people who need dialysis can't leave, how civilians are paying the price of the conflict. My oldest son, who is 8 years old, understands the connection. I caught him talking to his mother about the Jewish man on TV. His mother said, 'It's a Jewish man' and he said, 'This can't be, don't all Jews wear military outfits?' This is all he sees. He sees Israelis only at the checkpoints. He doesn't see them in my home. He doesn't go to their homes."
5 June 2011, Haaretz הארץ (Israel)
By Natasha Mozgovaya
WASHINGTON - Although his father Mamdouh Saidam was one of the founders of Fatah, Dr. Sabri Saidam, deputy secretary general of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, entered the political arena at the relatively late age of 34. It was then that he was appointed minister of communications and information technology in the Palestinian government. Today, no longer in government, the former "Mr. Technology" of the Palestinian Authority prefers the hat of researcher and Palestinian Internet guru. He is also one of the activists behind the establishment of the Palestinian domain ps.
"Coming from the IT field, I can tell you honestly that I've always felt as if I were carving in stone - getting computers or talking about e-government in Palestine was mission impossible," he says in an interview with Haaretz. "Now all the politicians are meeting bloggers and talking to them. There was no party interested in these people until the events in Tunisia and Egypt. They were considered to be time-wasters, kids."
Saidam is in Washington now working with the Aspen Institute to promote entrepreneurship among young Palestinians. "All of a sudden, everybody wants to know and have a private session to talk about Facebook and how they can open an account," he says.
Half of Palestinian households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have computers, according to Saidam, and about 30 percent are connected to the Internet.
"When the demonstrations started in Tunisia, there were 600,000 Palestinian Facebook users, and 200,000 of them were posting about politics. Each one of these 200,000 Facebook users is influencing five people around him. We're talking about over a million Palestinians over the age of 18. In terms of population size, that's 33 percent. In Egypt, that would be 28 million Egyptians, but there it took only 2,890 bloggers and computer activists to do what was done. The moral of the story is that there is a critical mass of Palestinians waiting to see how things are going to swing."
Saidam believes that all those who stormed Israel's borders on Nakba Day were simply in rehearsal mode. "Those who have broken the fear barrier, will be willing to do it again," he says. "Israel focuses on September, but they ought to focus on the 5th of June, the anniversary of the Six-Day War. There are already increased calls to march into the borders again."
There are two schools of thought on the matter, he says. "There's one that says: 'You've done it once, thank God there weren't more casualties, but don't do it again. Go to the borders, amass as many people as you can, but don't cross, because Israel has now learned the lesson. They can go and camp for a while, and this camping will send a message to Israel and the world, and it will help the Palestinians to build up pressure as preparations are made for September.' The other school of thought says: 'No, let's break fences and charge.' There are more supporters of the second approach."
Saidam says that the PA is beginning to understand the power of the Internet, and many of its members now want to meet with bloggers and open an account. "But there is no Palestinian Wael Ghonim [the young Google marketing executive who became a symbol of the revolution] . . . It's the issue of getting bored of the fact that they see leaders who existed for dozens of years. They don't want any leaders."
The trigger, he says, were the demonstrations held in the West Bank on March 15, when young Palestinians marched and called for an end to the rift between Hamas and Fatah. Abu Mazen then announced that he would be willing to go to Gaza, and an agreement was hammered out. "The young people felt they had some influence on the decision," says Saidam. "And I am telling my peers that they should not only passively listen but allow young blood to flow into the decision making of the parties."
Saidam notes that even Abu Mazen has a Facebook account. "He has a page where he posts all his meetings at president.ps. He is interested, but he is overwhelmed. Whenever I talk to him about computers, he is extremely supportive, but he doesn't have time to surf the Internet. He has a lot on his plate."
Saidam finds it amusing that a member of Congress recently asked whether the Palestinians use the Internet: "Do Palestinians use the Internet? Who is to blame for this Congressman not knowing whether we use Internet or not? No wonder they gave Netanyahu 29 standing ovations . . . they are totally ignorant. I've been in meetings in Congress, and there is a major problem, and it's a problem of education. If they visit Palestine, it's usually a courtesy visit of two hours."
Gaza a Facebook champion
Per capita, says Saidam, the largest number of Facebook users in the world is in Gaza.
"That's one thing people don't know," he says. Per capita, the largest number of video conferencing in the world is also in the Palestinian territories. "The legislative council used to meet through video conferencing in the West Bank and Gaza," says Saidam.
"There were medical exams conducted over the Internet. My mother, who lives in Gaza, has a heart problem. She comes to Makassed Hospital in East Jerusalem for treatment. And in so many cases, she was refused permission to go back to Gaza after treatment. That's one of the reasons I was trying to promote Internet treatment so people wouldn't have to travel. People takes it for granted because the culture of IT is so embedded in society, but there are economic hardships that prevent people from acquiring technology, even though 94 percent use cell phones."
Several weeks ago, Saidam launched a project in the territories in which experienced Internet users volunteer to teach parents, especially stay-at-home mothers, to use the computer and to surf the Internet. Every Monday he has a radio program in which he advises listeners about what should not be publicized on Facebook. If they surf in other countries, he tells them, they need to bear in mind that the boss has the ability to surf their page, and in the case of Palestinians, so does the Shin Bet security service.
Another problem he cites is that Palestinians telecommunications services are provided by Israeli companies. "This is a prime source of intelligence for the Shabak [Shin Bet], Mossad and whatever," he says. "Everybody here publishes his or her beliefs and opinions and pictures and family news - everything. I tell them: You are the owner of the information. Whatever you are hesitant about - don't release it."
According to Saidam, Palestinian politicians are afraid of the Internet because they have no control over those who surf it. "But then they came to realize that it's something that is totally out of the censorship scissors, nobody can gag anybody else, it's a free world."
The Third Intifada Facebook page, he notes was created in Lebanon - not in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Facebook, under Jewish pressure, decided to close it. But being controversial is being famous. After Facebook closed it, there were several new pages."
Saidam says that young Palestinians are more committed than most would believe. "When you have a kid coming to his parents at Yarmouk refugee camp [in Syria], telling them he's going to have dinner in Jaffa, and they laugh at him and don't take him seriously. And then he ends up going with Israeli peace activists to Jaffa, has dinner there, gives an interview to Channel 10 and then gives himself up to the Israeli police. I think any Israeli general should worry.
"I lived in Gaza and the West Bank and have seen every adventure you can imagine, but to have this level of commitment, to come all the way to Jaffa, that's what makes me think that the 5th of May was only a rehearsal. Most young people are not talking about the peace process or the Arab initiative or the 1967 borders. If a new revolution erupts, it will be a revolution led by more sophisticated minds than those in the second intifada."
Right-wing domination
Unlike Netanyahu, he says, the Palestinians did not say "no" to everything. But Netanyahu's speech has, for all intents and purposes, eliminated the possibility that the PA will renege on its plans to ask the United Nations to vote on Palestinian statehood in September. "Our feeling is that Israeli society is dominated by right-wingers," he says. "I believe Netanyahu is receiving intelligence reports that the Palestinians won't make any further noise."
Still, the situation on the ground has changed, he says. The Palestinians have never enjoyed more support and have finally succeeded in building a consensus. The Israeli leadership, he notes, initially said that there was nothing to discuss because there was no unity among the Palestinians, and now it says that there is nothing to discuss because there is unity.
Saidam has the following to say about Hamas: "Nobody wants them to be part of the government, and they know it. Two things they won't do - they won't sit in the government, and they won't conduct the negotiations. And they know there will be a referendum."
Saidam thinks that Palestinian unity is a good thing. "We had our worst brain drain, not during the 40 plus years of occupation, but during the time of Palestinian disunity. Hamas, despite all the negative things, stands for 1967 borders, for the same political vision as Fatah."
Saidam lives in Ramallah with his two children. He has a doctorate from a British university but has never considered leaving his home. "My father was the deputy commander of the Palestinian forces in Jordan. He was diagnosed with cancer. He passed away during the conflict in 1971. I was four months old, and I had taken it upon myself that upon concluding my studies, I would go back to Palestine. In December 1995, I went to visit my family in the refugee camps of Gaza. I was encouraged to come back and live in Palestine and fulfill my dream. I have two kids, they are in Ramallah. No matter what happens, we are not leaving. I think even if we get slaughtered in our homes, we will not leave."
Every Palestinian who has lost a loved one in the conflict has a personal dilemma, he says. "In order to achieve peace with the Israelis, they have to understand our lives on the other side of the fence, how my mother spends 36 hours without electricity in Gaza, how people who need dialysis can't leave, how civilians are paying the price of the conflict. My oldest son, who is 8 years old, understands the connection. I caught him talking to his mother about the Jewish man on TV. His mother said, 'It's a Jewish man' and he said, 'This can't be, don't all Jews wear military outfits?' This is all he sees. He sees Israelis only at the checkpoints. He doesn't see them in my home. He doesn't go to their homes."
terça-feira, 31 de maio de 2011
L’ETAU ARABE SE RESSERRE
31 mai 2011, Association France Palestine Solidarité http://www.france-palestine.org
Renée-Anne Gutter
L’Egypte a rouvert sa frontière avec Gaza. Et la Ligue arabe va entreprendre les démarches pour la reconnaissance d’un Etat palestinien.
L’étau arabe se resserre autour d’Israël. Comme promis par ses nouveaux dirigeants, l’Egypte a officiellement rouvert sa frontière avec Gaza. Ce qui, à l’inquiétude d’Israël, scelle la détermination de l’Egypte à légitimer le Hamas (qui contrôle Gaza) et à promouvoir la réconciliation du Hamas avec le Fatah, de façon à ramener les islamistes dans le giron de l’Autorité palestinienne de Mahmoud Abbas.
Car c’est avec l’accord du raïs Abbas que s’est rouvert samedi le poste frontalier de Rafah. L’Autorité palestinienne en avait été chassée à la suite du putsch du Hamas à Gaza en 2007. La mission d’encadrement douanier de l’Union européenne (EUBAM) avait alors quitté Rafah, et l’Egypte avait fermé la frontière de son côté, ne la rouvrant plus que de façon épisodique. EUBAM est restée en "stand by" depuis lors, prête à reprendre du service dès que sollicitée. Mais le Hamas l’a précisé dimanche : il ne veut plus d’observateurs étrangers à Rafah, son propre contrôle et celui de l’Egypte suffisent.
L’Egypte maintient d’ailleurs des limitations. Le terminal de Rafah est désormais ouvert quotidiennement, sauf jours féries, sans aucune restriction pour les femmes, enfants et hommes de plus de 40 ans. Mais les hommes de 18 à 40 ans doivent se munir au préalable d’un visa égyptien, délivré à Ramallah ou Gaza, si c’est pour sortir de Gaza, ou à l’étranger si c’est pour entrer à Gaza. Et même sous le nouveau régime, Le Caire garde une liste noire de Palestiniens indésirables. L’entrée et la sortie de marchandises sont interdites elles aussi. N’empêche, pour les Gazaouis, c’est une sérieuse bouffée d’air.
Et pour de nombreux commentateurs ici, Israël pourrait en tirer profit. Selon les experts, la réouverture du terminal de Rafah n’augmente pas énormément la menace sécuritaire. De toute façon, en dépit du siège israélien, armes et activistes s’infiltrent à Gaza via le réseau de tunnels qui la relie au Sinaï égyptien. Même le mur que l’Egypte du président Moubarak avait tenté de construire sous Rafah est resté inefficace. Par contre, la réouverture du terminal - qui fissure sensiblement le siège israélien - pourrait permettre à Israël de se désengager davantage de Gaza et de reporter une partie des responsabilités locales sur l’Egypte. Mais dans l’immédiat, le gouvernement Netanyahou reste braqué sur le gain politique et terroriste que l’Egypte, selon lui, octroie au Hamas.
Autre contrariété pour Israël : la Ligue arabe a annoncé samedi qu’elle allait non seulement soutenir le recours des Palestiniens à l’Onu en septembre pour la reconnaissance d’un Etat souverain, mais compte elle-même entreprendre "les démarches légales" à cet effet. Selon son Comité de suivi, qui s’est réuni au Qatar en présence de Mahmoud Abbas, la Ligue va œuvrer à la fois auprès de l’Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité. Car le président de l’Assemblée, le Suisse Joseph Deiss, a souligné que l’Etat palestinien ne pourrait être reconnu sans l’appui du Conseil de sécurité. Et là, la requête palestinienne risque de buter sur le veto américain.
Mais les Palestiniens brandissent déjà la parade. Selon leur négociateur en chef, Saèb Erekat, en cas de veto américain, ils recourront à la résolution 377. Intitulée "Union pour le maintien de la paix", cette résolution prise par l’Assemblée générale en 1950 rogne les ailes du Conseil de sécurité. Elle stipule que "dans tout cas où paraît exister une menace contre la paix [ ] et où, du fait que l’unanimité n’a pu se réaliser parmi ses membres permanents, le Conseil de sécurité manque à s’acquitter de sa responsabilité principale dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales", l’Assemblée générale peut se saisir de la question. Et à en croire des responsables de l’OLP, certains pays européens qui seraient réticents à reconnaître l’Etat palestinien, soutiendraient néanmoins la mise en œuvre de la résolution 377. Alors que le gouvernement Netanyahou compte précisément sur la fermeté de l’Europe pour torpiller le projet unilatéral des Palestiniens [1].
[1] L’Espagne vient de déclarer qu’elle reconnaîtra l’Etat de Palestine avant septembre. Voir, en anglais, PNN :
http://english.pnn.ps/index.php?opt...
publié par la Libre Belgique
http://www.lalibre.be/actu/internat...
Renée-Anne Gutter
L’Egypte a rouvert sa frontière avec Gaza. Et la Ligue arabe va entreprendre les démarches pour la reconnaissance d’un Etat palestinien.
L’étau arabe se resserre autour d’Israël. Comme promis par ses nouveaux dirigeants, l’Egypte a officiellement rouvert sa frontière avec Gaza. Ce qui, à l’inquiétude d’Israël, scelle la détermination de l’Egypte à légitimer le Hamas (qui contrôle Gaza) et à promouvoir la réconciliation du Hamas avec le Fatah, de façon à ramener les islamistes dans le giron de l’Autorité palestinienne de Mahmoud Abbas.
Car c’est avec l’accord du raïs Abbas que s’est rouvert samedi le poste frontalier de Rafah. L’Autorité palestinienne en avait été chassée à la suite du putsch du Hamas à Gaza en 2007. La mission d’encadrement douanier de l’Union européenne (EUBAM) avait alors quitté Rafah, et l’Egypte avait fermé la frontière de son côté, ne la rouvrant plus que de façon épisodique. EUBAM est restée en "stand by" depuis lors, prête à reprendre du service dès que sollicitée. Mais le Hamas l’a précisé dimanche : il ne veut plus d’observateurs étrangers à Rafah, son propre contrôle et celui de l’Egypte suffisent.
L’Egypte maintient d’ailleurs des limitations. Le terminal de Rafah est désormais ouvert quotidiennement, sauf jours féries, sans aucune restriction pour les femmes, enfants et hommes de plus de 40 ans. Mais les hommes de 18 à 40 ans doivent se munir au préalable d’un visa égyptien, délivré à Ramallah ou Gaza, si c’est pour sortir de Gaza, ou à l’étranger si c’est pour entrer à Gaza. Et même sous le nouveau régime, Le Caire garde une liste noire de Palestiniens indésirables. L’entrée et la sortie de marchandises sont interdites elles aussi. N’empêche, pour les Gazaouis, c’est une sérieuse bouffée d’air.
Et pour de nombreux commentateurs ici, Israël pourrait en tirer profit. Selon les experts, la réouverture du terminal de Rafah n’augmente pas énormément la menace sécuritaire. De toute façon, en dépit du siège israélien, armes et activistes s’infiltrent à Gaza via le réseau de tunnels qui la relie au Sinaï égyptien. Même le mur que l’Egypte du président Moubarak avait tenté de construire sous Rafah est resté inefficace. Par contre, la réouverture du terminal - qui fissure sensiblement le siège israélien - pourrait permettre à Israël de se désengager davantage de Gaza et de reporter une partie des responsabilités locales sur l’Egypte. Mais dans l’immédiat, le gouvernement Netanyahou reste braqué sur le gain politique et terroriste que l’Egypte, selon lui, octroie au Hamas.
Autre contrariété pour Israël : la Ligue arabe a annoncé samedi qu’elle allait non seulement soutenir le recours des Palestiniens à l’Onu en septembre pour la reconnaissance d’un Etat souverain, mais compte elle-même entreprendre "les démarches légales" à cet effet. Selon son Comité de suivi, qui s’est réuni au Qatar en présence de Mahmoud Abbas, la Ligue va œuvrer à la fois auprès de l’Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité. Car le président de l’Assemblée, le Suisse Joseph Deiss, a souligné que l’Etat palestinien ne pourrait être reconnu sans l’appui du Conseil de sécurité. Et là, la requête palestinienne risque de buter sur le veto américain.
Mais les Palestiniens brandissent déjà la parade. Selon leur négociateur en chef, Saèb Erekat, en cas de veto américain, ils recourront à la résolution 377. Intitulée "Union pour le maintien de la paix", cette résolution prise par l’Assemblée générale en 1950 rogne les ailes du Conseil de sécurité. Elle stipule que "dans tout cas où paraît exister une menace contre la paix [ ] et où, du fait que l’unanimité n’a pu se réaliser parmi ses membres permanents, le Conseil de sécurité manque à s’acquitter de sa responsabilité principale dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales", l’Assemblée générale peut se saisir de la question. Et à en croire des responsables de l’OLP, certains pays européens qui seraient réticents à reconnaître l’Etat palestinien, soutiendraient néanmoins la mise en œuvre de la résolution 377. Alors que le gouvernement Netanyahou compte précisément sur la fermeté de l’Europe pour torpiller le projet unilatéral des Palestiniens [1].
[1] L’Espagne vient de déclarer qu’elle reconnaîtra l’Etat de Palestine avant septembre. Voir, en anglais, PNN :
http://english.pnn.ps/index.php?opt...
publié par la Libre Belgique
http://www.lalibre.be/actu/internat...
segunda-feira, 30 de maio de 2011
ISRAEL’S SIEGE FREED GAZA’S YOUTH
26 May 2011, The Electronic Intifada (USA)
Mohammed Rabah Suliman* (Gaza Strip)
Palestinians were in disbelief over the news of a reconciliation deal between the two largest Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, brokered by Egypt which, meanwhile, repeated that ending the siege is a priority. Palestinian youth living in the besieged Gaza Strip were quick to start envisioning a new life in a Gaza free from both from the political divisions and the siege.
In 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, beating Fatah into second place. Fatah has long dominated the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and controlled the Palestinian Authority since it was created after the 1993 Oslo accords. Hamas is not a member of the PLO.
A year later, a short-lived Palestinian national unity government uniting the factions fell apart amid US-supported efforts to undermine it, and Hamas ousted Fatah from the Gaza Strip in a distressing fierce ground battle.
Ever since, the population of Gaza has been destined to live under severe hermetic siege imposed by Israel along with the former Egyptian government of ousted President Hosni Mubarak.
Plenty of reports were written addressing the humanitarian crisis that resulted from this siege, along with Israel’s aggressive policies toward Palestinian civilians. Solidarity convoys have cascaded into Gaza one after another in an attempt to alleviate the suffering inflicted upon the Palestinians as a result of the siege.
For the youth in Gaza, one thing, however, has been bizarrely disregarded, which is the positive side of Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip.
Despite its many severely negative results, Israel’s siege of Gaza has offered Palestinian youth a service none had offered before. It offered new paths for us in our struggle for freedom, deepened our patriotic sentiment and finally created an environment that fosters a collective sense of selflessness and cooperation. It has created a young generation that truly cares.
Back in 2006, when Israel’s policies to besiege Gaza were still new, the people of Gaza were still unable to estimate the magnitude of the debacle ahead of them. Shortly after, prices started to shoot up, crossing borders became difficult, ubiquitous power cuts mercilessly dominated every aspect of life.
It was unthinkable, even for the Palestinians in Gaza, that they would be able to carry on with their new life for a long time.
Perhaps that was Israel’s logic. They might have thought: “They won’t be able to tolerate the base life we will force them to live under, we will suffocate them from every direction, we will cause them so much pain to bear. Soon they will blow up from within.”
But we didn’t. And unexpectedly, almost four years since the siege has started, and despite pervasive misery, human suffering and collective punishment, life still goes on.
For us, the youth in Gaza, life under siege was profoundly different. Unable to cope with its oppressiveness, life at first was intolerably tormenting. Anger and frustration were the outcome of our dashed hopes each time we came to realize the fact that ending this siege was anything but foreseeable.
Helpless, we were left to the vast amount of darkness surrounding our minds and bodies. Every now and then, we could escape this suffering momentarily as we loosened ourselves of our oppressive surroundings. This meant spending some time by the Gaza seashore dotted with Israeli warships at night, or at some cafe nearby where the musical bubbling of our water pipes were inescapably mingled with the unnerving hums of a few frenzied power generators.
However, no matter how much we tried to separate ourselves from the political context surrounding us, we couldn’t. We were thrown back into it by the huge extent of misery imposed upon us.
Many of us thus were left with a political mindset which ultimately triggered us into fruit-bearing action.
Plenty of Gaza youth have had an interest in politics, following up on news, reading reports and analyses. Reading has become the last and sole resort when we had nothing else to do. Soon we were demanding more and more books to read.
Reading has struck a new light in the dark; it has blown new winds into the stillness, and added flavor to our humdrum lives. It was too beautiful to resist. Besides reading, many Gaza youth remarkably developed an interest in documenting Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians through writing, blogging, making films and networking. Israel was their interest. Everything that has to do with Israel was worth stopping for; it was a sign of sophisticated interest. On the ground, hyper-activism was largely manifest in the immense variety of activities carried out and administered by youth groups, social movements and networks.
One of the remarkable youth groups newly initiated inside Gaza is the Palestine Youth Advocacy Network “PYAN”— which is also a word in Arabic that could mean exposition, representation, rhetoric or radiance, all of which have to do with the nature of work the team undertakes.
The network defines itself as “a fresh movement towards democratic endeavors in Palestine and breaking misconceptions about the occupied territories through global dialogue and reporting from the ground.” It operates regularly, holding workshops in coordination with international and local institutions with the intention of “[playing] an innovative role in assisting the Palestinian youth get the knowledge and acquire the skills needed to be up to the challenge of advocating their cause and sacred rights in the face of the misinformation imposed by the western mainstream media.”
Samah Saleh, a cofounder of PYAN, told me what role the siege has played in setting up the advocacy network and the abundance of other youth groups:
“The siege has everything to do with the emergence of PYAN. Gaza has been under siege for about four years, quite the same years young Gazans my age [have] been busy attempting to understand the interaction of global, regional and internal politics on their lives. In Gaza, the siege was the elephant in the room and Gazans were on their own, living, defying the siege’s intrusion on their every life, no matter how simple. We formed PYAN to be the platform of Gaza’s youth that addresses their urgent need to bring their stories out of besieged Gaza to the world.”
It isn’t quite appealing to speak of the inhumane siege without focusing on Israel’s crimes against Palestinian civilians. But having already blasted away any cliched representation of ourselves as terrorists, we now refuse to be continuously framed as dying of hunger or retreating to a corner and sitting in the dark. Our ability to turn each suffering into a source of inspiration preserves our dignity and fuels our unstoppable determination.
*Mohammed Rabah Suliman, 21, is a Palestinian student and blogger from Gaza. He studies English Literature at the Islamic University and blogs at Gaza Diaries of Peace and War at http://msuliman.wordpress.com. He can be followed on Twitter at http://twitter.com/#!/imPalestine.
Mohammed Rabah Suliman* (Gaza Strip)
Palestinians were in disbelief over the news of a reconciliation deal between the two largest Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, brokered by Egypt which, meanwhile, repeated that ending the siege is a priority. Palestinian youth living in the besieged Gaza Strip were quick to start envisioning a new life in a Gaza free from both from the political divisions and the siege.
In 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, beating Fatah into second place. Fatah has long dominated the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and controlled the Palestinian Authority since it was created after the 1993 Oslo accords. Hamas is not a member of the PLO.
A year later, a short-lived Palestinian national unity government uniting the factions fell apart amid US-supported efforts to undermine it, and Hamas ousted Fatah from the Gaza Strip in a distressing fierce ground battle.
Ever since, the population of Gaza has been destined to live under severe hermetic siege imposed by Israel along with the former Egyptian government of ousted President Hosni Mubarak.
Plenty of reports were written addressing the humanitarian crisis that resulted from this siege, along with Israel’s aggressive policies toward Palestinian civilians. Solidarity convoys have cascaded into Gaza one after another in an attempt to alleviate the suffering inflicted upon the Palestinians as a result of the siege.
For the youth in Gaza, one thing, however, has been bizarrely disregarded, which is the positive side of Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip.
Despite its many severely negative results, Israel’s siege of Gaza has offered Palestinian youth a service none had offered before. It offered new paths for us in our struggle for freedom, deepened our patriotic sentiment and finally created an environment that fosters a collective sense of selflessness and cooperation. It has created a young generation that truly cares.
Back in 2006, when Israel’s policies to besiege Gaza were still new, the people of Gaza were still unable to estimate the magnitude of the debacle ahead of them. Shortly after, prices started to shoot up, crossing borders became difficult, ubiquitous power cuts mercilessly dominated every aspect of life.
It was unthinkable, even for the Palestinians in Gaza, that they would be able to carry on with their new life for a long time.
Perhaps that was Israel’s logic. They might have thought: “They won’t be able to tolerate the base life we will force them to live under, we will suffocate them from every direction, we will cause them so much pain to bear. Soon they will blow up from within.”
But we didn’t. And unexpectedly, almost four years since the siege has started, and despite pervasive misery, human suffering and collective punishment, life still goes on.
For us, the youth in Gaza, life under siege was profoundly different. Unable to cope with its oppressiveness, life at first was intolerably tormenting. Anger and frustration were the outcome of our dashed hopes each time we came to realize the fact that ending this siege was anything but foreseeable.
Helpless, we were left to the vast amount of darkness surrounding our minds and bodies. Every now and then, we could escape this suffering momentarily as we loosened ourselves of our oppressive surroundings. This meant spending some time by the Gaza seashore dotted with Israeli warships at night, or at some cafe nearby where the musical bubbling of our water pipes were inescapably mingled with the unnerving hums of a few frenzied power generators.
However, no matter how much we tried to separate ourselves from the political context surrounding us, we couldn’t. We were thrown back into it by the huge extent of misery imposed upon us.
Many of us thus were left with a political mindset which ultimately triggered us into fruit-bearing action.
Plenty of Gaza youth have had an interest in politics, following up on news, reading reports and analyses. Reading has become the last and sole resort when we had nothing else to do. Soon we were demanding more and more books to read.
Reading has struck a new light in the dark; it has blown new winds into the stillness, and added flavor to our humdrum lives. It was too beautiful to resist. Besides reading, many Gaza youth remarkably developed an interest in documenting Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians through writing, blogging, making films and networking. Israel was their interest. Everything that has to do with Israel was worth stopping for; it was a sign of sophisticated interest. On the ground, hyper-activism was largely manifest in the immense variety of activities carried out and administered by youth groups, social movements and networks.
One of the remarkable youth groups newly initiated inside Gaza is the Palestine Youth Advocacy Network “PYAN”— which is also a word in Arabic that could mean exposition, representation, rhetoric or radiance, all of which have to do with the nature of work the team undertakes.
The network defines itself as “a fresh movement towards democratic endeavors in Palestine and breaking misconceptions about the occupied territories through global dialogue and reporting from the ground.” It operates regularly, holding workshops in coordination with international and local institutions with the intention of “[playing] an innovative role in assisting the Palestinian youth get the knowledge and acquire the skills needed to be up to the challenge of advocating their cause and sacred rights in the face of the misinformation imposed by the western mainstream media.”
Samah Saleh, a cofounder of PYAN, told me what role the siege has played in setting up the advocacy network and the abundance of other youth groups:
“The siege has everything to do with the emergence of PYAN. Gaza has been under siege for about four years, quite the same years young Gazans my age [have] been busy attempting to understand the interaction of global, regional and internal politics on their lives. In Gaza, the siege was the elephant in the room and Gazans were on their own, living, defying the siege’s intrusion on their every life, no matter how simple. We formed PYAN to be the platform of Gaza’s youth that addresses their urgent need to bring their stories out of besieged Gaza to the world.”
It isn’t quite appealing to speak of the inhumane siege without focusing on Israel’s crimes against Palestinian civilians. But having already blasted away any cliched representation of ourselves as terrorists, we now refuse to be continuously framed as dying of hunger or retreating to a corner and sitting in the dark. Our ability to turn each suffering into a source of inspiration preserves our dignity and fuels our unstoppable determination.
*Mohammed Rabah Suliman, 21, is a Palestinian student and blogger from Gaza. He studies English Literature at the Islamic University and blogs at Gaza Diaries of Peace and War at http://msuliman.wordpress.com. He can be followed on Twitter at http://twitter.com/#!/imPalestine.
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